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Constitution of Utah, Article I § 2 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority 
for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform their government as 
the public welfare may require. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 5 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or 
invasion, the public safety requires it. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
N o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 11 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either 
of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 26 
No private or special law shall be enacted when a general law can be applicable. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII § 4 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both 
original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with 
the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. N o State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Administrative Code R 25-14 
R25-14. Payment of Attorneys Fees in Death Penalty Cases. 
R25-14-1. Authority and Purpose. 
(1) This rule is implemented pursuant to Section 78-35a-202. 
(2) The purpose of the rule is to establish the procedures and maximum compensation 
amounts to be paid for attorneys fees and litigation expenses by the Division of Finance to 
legal counsel appointed by district courts to represent indigent persons sentenced to death 
who request representation to file an action under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. 
R25-14-2. Request for Payment. 
In order to obtain payment for attorney's fees and litigation expenses, counsel appointed by a 
district court, pursuant to Section 78-35a-202(2)(c), shall present to the Division of Finance a 
certified copy of the district court order of appointment of legal counsel and a signed 
Request for Payment verifying the work has been performed as provided in Section R25-14-
4 pursuant to the schedule of payments set forth in that section. 
R25-14-3. Scope of Services. 
(1) All appointed counsel, by accepting the court appointment to represent an indigent client 
sentenced to death and by presenting a Request for Payment to the Division of Finance, 
agree to provide all reasonable and necessary post-conviction legal services for the client, 
including timely filing an action under the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-
Conviction Remedies Act and representing the client in all legal proceedings conducted 
thereafter including, if requested by the client, an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
(2) All appointed counsel agree to accept as full compensation for the legal sendees 
performed and litigation costs incurred the amounts provided in the Schedule of Payments 
of Attorneys Fees found in Section R25-14-4. 
R25-14-4. Schedule of Payments of Attorneys Fees. 
All counsel appointed to jointly represent a single client shall be paid, in the aggregate, 
according to the following schedule of payments upon certification to the Division of 
Finance that the specified legal sendee was performed or the specified events have occurred: 
(1) $5,000.00 upon appointment by the district court and presentation of a signed Request 
for Payment to the Division of Finance. 
(2) $5,000.00 upon timely filing a petition for post-conviction relief 
(3) $10,000.00 after all discovery has been completed, all prehearing motions have been ruled 
upon, and a date for an evidentiary hearing has been set. 
(4) If an evidentiary hearing is required, $5,000.00 on the date the first witness is sworn. 
(5) $7,500.00 if an appeal is filed from a final order of the district court. $5,000.00 of the total 
shall be paid when the brief on behalf of the indigent person is filed and $2,500.00 when the 
Utah Supreme Court finally remits the case to the district court. 
(6) An additional fee of $100 per hour, but in no event to exceed $5,000.00 in the aggregate, 
shall be paid if: 
(a) counsel satisfy the requirements of Rule 4-505, Utah Code of Judicial Administration; and 
(b) the district court finds: 
(i) that the appointed counsel provided extraordinary legal services that were not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of accepting the appointment, such as responding to or filing a 
petition for interlocutory appeal, and 
(ii) the services were both reasonable and necessary for the presentation of the client's claims. 
(c) These additional fees shall be paid upon approval by the district court and compliance 
with the provisions of this rule. 
R25-14-5. Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses. 
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total of 
$20,000.00 in any one case for court approved investigators, expert witnesses, and 
consultants. Before payment is made for litigation expenses, the appointed counsel must 
submit a request for payment to the Division of Finance including: 
(1) a detailed invoice of all expenses for which payment is requested; and 
(2) written approval of the district court certifying that the expenses were both reasonable 
and necessary for the presentation of the client's claims. 
R25-14-6. Withdrawal of Counsel. 
(1) If an attorney appointed under Section 78-35a-202 is permitted to withdraw by the court 
or, due to death or disability, is unable to continue, the attorney shall be paid only for the 
actual work performed to tne date of withdrawal as certified by the court. 
(2) If withdrawal is ordered by the court because of counsel's improper conduct or the court 
finds that a foreseeable conflict of interest which should have been disclosed prior to 
appointment existed, all compensation received by the attorney shall be repaid to the 
Division of Finance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3.5 
(1) An agency's written statement is a rule if it conforms to the definition of a rule under g e c t 4 o n 53, 
46a-2, but the written statement is not enforceable unless it is made as a rule in accordance with the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(2) An agency's written statement that is made as a rule in accordance with the requirements of this 
chapter is enforceable and has the effect of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-308 
Counsel assigned by a court to represent an indigent in criminal, post-conviction, or habeas corpus 
proceedings is immune from suit if the attorney provides the legal services: 
(1) at no cost; or 
(2) for only a substantially reduced cost that is applied to, but does not cover, expenses of the 
service; and 
(3) without gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but 
was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground 
could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been 
affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing scheduled no 
less than 30 days prior to the signing of the death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter 
allowing challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for 
indigent defendants. 
(2)(a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether 
the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record regarding the defendant's 
indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly appoint counsel 
who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record by 
the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the rejection. 
(c) Costs of counse l and o the r reasonable litigation expenses incurred in p rov id ing the 
representa t ion p rov ided for in this sect ion shall be paid from state funds by the Divis ion of 
Finance accord ing to rules established pur suan t to Title 63 , Chap te r 46a, U t a h 
Adminis t ra t ive Rulemaking Act . 
U t a h C o d e o f Jud ic ia l C o n d u c t , C a n o n 3 
A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a full-time judge take precedence over all the 
judge's other activities. The judge's judicial duties include all the duties of the judge's office 
prescribed by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply. 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification 
is required or permitted by rule, or transfer to another court occurs. 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. A judge shall not be swayed 
by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the judge. 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and 
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and should require similar conduct of 
lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control. 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the 
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not 
limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual 
orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use all reasonable efforts to 
deter, staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and control from doing so. A judge 
should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by 
words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, 
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This Canon 
does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual 
orientation or socioeconomic status, or other similar factors, are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or that person's 
lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither 
initiate nor consider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending 
or impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court personnel whose function is to aid the 
judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges provided that the 
judge does not abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the case pending before the court. 
N o communication respecting a pending or impending proceeding shall occur between the trial 
judge and an appellate court unless a copy of any written communication or the substance of any 
oral communication is provided to all parties. A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested 
expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives notice to the parties 
of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable 
opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the consent of the parties either in writing or on the 
record, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters 
pending before the judge. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly. 
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any public 
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any 
nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A judge should 
require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction and control. 
This Canon does not prohibit a judge from making public statements in the course of official duties 
or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. This Canon does not apply to 
proceedings in which a judge is a litigant in a personal capacity. 
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict other than in a court order or 
opinion in a proceeding but may express appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial 
system and the community. 
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial duties, information acquired 
in a judicial capacity that is not available to the public. 
C. Administrative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or 
prejudice, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and cooperate with other 
judges and court officials in the administration of court business. 
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and control to 
observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from 
manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties. 
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other judges should take 
reasonable measures to assure the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper 
performance of their other judicial responsibilities. 
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise the power of appointment 
impartially and on the basis of merit, and shall avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not 
approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures 
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware. This 
section does not apply to information generated and communicated under the policies of the 
Judicial Performance Evaluation Program. 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, a strong personal 
bias involving an issue in a case, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding; 
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, had practiced law with a lawyer 
who had served in the matter at the time of their association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a 
material witness concerning it; 
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or 
child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, 
has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or has 
any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of 
them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially 
affected by the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. 
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests, and 
should make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the 
judge's spouse and minor children residing in the judge's household. 
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E may disclose the basis 
of the judge's disqualification and ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence 
of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for 
disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers, 
without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge need not be disqualified, and the judge is 
then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be 
entered on the record, or if written, filed in the case file. 
Utah R. App. P. 11 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, 
including the presentence report in criminal matters, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index 
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in 
all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the original may 
be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under 
paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall securely fasten 
the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the following order: 
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet; 
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and 
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report. 
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bot tom right corner of every page of the collated index, docket 
sheet, and all original papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the 
cover page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number 
using one series of numerals for the entire record. 
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall collate the 
papers, depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental record in the same order as the original 
record and mark the bot tom right corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the 
cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts 
constituting the supplemental record with a sequential number beginning with the number next 
following the number of the last page of the original record. 
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall contain a 
reference to the date on which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed in the trial court and the 
starting page of the record on which the paper, deposition or transcript will be found. 
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking out 
the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or 
briefing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event that more than 
one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this 
rule and shall take any other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and 
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(d)(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial 
court as part of the record on appeal. 
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion 
o f a p a r t y , t h e c l u i * * . . * s "*-*- ' li • •• - ••'>• * 
record on appeal. 
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or 
motion of a party, the agency shall include all papers in the agency file as part of the record. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant 
shall request from the court executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on 
file as the appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state that the 
transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal. Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a 
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format within the request 
for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the 
appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy v. nh tin • vrk 
of the appellate court. 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to 
urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, die 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in 
Miv
^tiding the relevant portions of the transcript. 
vcyv3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to be included, uw 
appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will 
be presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy 
of the statement. If the appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, 
the appellee shall, within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the statement of 
the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation of additional parts to be included. Unless 
within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so 
notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either request the parts or move 
in the trial court for an order requiring the appellant to do so. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as defined in paragraph 
(a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues 
presented by the appeal arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of 
the facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the issues 
presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions as the trial court 
may consider necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial 
court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court 
within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of 
the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when transcript is 
unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a 
transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil 
case, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available 
means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve 
objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and any objections 
or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as 
settled and approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly 
discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that 
court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted 
from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the 
appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or 
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted, 
i uc moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a 
statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after sendee, any party may serve objections to 
the proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and content of the record shall be 
presented to the appellate court. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as 
otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, 
provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to 
have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, 
identifying the subjects of the information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable documents, data 
compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its 
claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making 
available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other 
evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the 
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any 
person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which 
may be entered in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by 
subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision 
(f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the 
meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being served. A party 
shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available and is not 
excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the investigation of 
the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because 
another party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or less; 
(,i Hi)(y\)(nj lor judicial review ol adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings ol an 
in I in ninistrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
(a)(2)(A)(\i) in which an> part) not admitted to the practice Uu\ in Utah is not represented b) counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) Jn an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are subject to 
discovery under subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) \ part) shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at 
trial lo present evidence under
 R u l e s m m o r 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered b> the court, this disclosure shall, 
with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the 
case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly in voh e gi\ ing expert testimonj, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party. The report shall 
contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts 
and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each 
opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the 
witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; 
and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial oi b\ 
deposition within Ihe preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, Ihe disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery 
as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut 
evidence on the same subject matter identified by another parly under paragraph (^)(B) n illiin 
60 days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the tollo" linn inhumation 
regarding the evidence that it may present at Irial other than solely for impi .it IIIIK nl 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each 
witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the party may 
call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a 
deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the 
deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of 
other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and those which the 
party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by 
subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a 
different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any 
objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under 
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to 
the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, 
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed 
waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown. 
(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, all 
disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the 
following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written 
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other 
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance 
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(b)(1) In general Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or 
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other 
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable 
matter. It is i lot giuui.u K*r objection thai liic iuionnation sought w ill be inadmissible at the trial 
if the information souuht appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) Limitations, I he frequency or extent 01 use oi nit discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought *s 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample 
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discover}" is 
unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake \ 
litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a 
motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(3) 1 rial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) ol tiw:,. 
party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or foi trial b\ or lor 
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking 
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the pan- is 
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required show ing has been made, the 
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinion or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation, 
A party may obtain, without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject 
matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the 
required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that 
person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The provisions of Rule 
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this 
paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or 
approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other 
recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement 
by the person making i1 'm/1 'v^tomporaneo^b' record^1 
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(4)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions 
may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall 
be conducted within 60 days after the report is provided. 
(b)(4)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained 
or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and 
who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a 
showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking 
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. 
(b)(4)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(4)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable 
fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule; and 
(b)(4)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this rule the court 
may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the 
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and 
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert. 
(b)(5) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. When a party withholds 
information otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject 
to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall 
describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a 
manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties 
to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, 
accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer 
with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good 
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a 
deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a 
designation of the time or place; 
(c)(3) that the discovery i nay be 1 lad oi iJI> b ; ' ai :t lethod of disco\ ery otl: lei tl lai i tl mt selected b;y 1:1 ic 
party seeking discovery; 
(c)(4) that certaii 11 i latters not be inquired mio. or nun me scope oi uie <J]sco\er\ he \r,\\i , -.1 to 
certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; 
(LJ(/ ; nidi ti • J --aci oi oinci coiiiiuciiuai rescarcn, uexelopment, or commercial information 
not be disci, he disclosed DIIK in :\ drsipnated u.-i\ 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed 
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part,, the court may, on such terms 
and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery, rhe 
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt: under subdivision (a)(2), except 
as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have met and conferred 
as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless the court 
upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a part; i 
conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay am oihe; 
party's discovery 
(e) Supplement-.* -^*!; *.<f i espouses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision (a) or 
responded to a request lor discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure 
or response to in^ ,,H>-» "^Wmaiion thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstance 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under 
subdivision (a) if the part} learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is 
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been 
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to 
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty 
extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a 
deposition of the expert. 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request 
for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some material 
respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise 
been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise 
stipulated or directed by order. 
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in person 
or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the 
possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by 
subdivision (a)(1), and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule 
the meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good 
faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under 
subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made 
or will be made; 
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed, 
whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to 
particular issues; 
(f)(2)(C) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these rules, 
and what other limitations should be imposed; 
(f)(2)(D) the deadline for filing the description of the i acti ml ai id legal basis foi allocatii lg fai ill: to 
a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and 
(f)(2)(E) ai ly otl lei 01 dei s tl lat si 1.01 lid be entered tiy tl le court,. 
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any 
event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity 
with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also include each of 
the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(6), except that the date or dates for pretrial conferences, final 
pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the close 
of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discover} phm or am putt dieieol. 
the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any lopk- on 
which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions 
established by these rules shall govern any subject not included within the mrii<V slinulnn*d 
discovery plan. 
(1 »M i \ i r p;ut> inn tnfiiesl ;i >< l inl i i l ini ' .inn niaiiaiieiiicni i niiliTent e oi OHRI imdu Knur muni 
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery plan and 
discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery 
plan and oH<^ Th<* ^pu'ation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder, 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses,, and objections. Every request for discovery or 
response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of record or 
by the party if the party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The signature of the 
attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the request, response, or 
objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs 
of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance 
of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the party 
making the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action 
with respect to it until it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its ox-
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the pari) on whose beiuu *he 
request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a 
reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding in 
another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner and 
subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in 
this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition 
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person whose deposition is to 
be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising during the taking 
of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted 
to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
(i)(l) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in Rule 
30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach to 
the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue. 
Utah R. Civ. P . 60 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the 
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the 
appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of 
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (:\i the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based bus been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of 
a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be 
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
I 1 
(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self representation, and ll I I K . : ^ .,., 
has the right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces a substantial probability of 
deprivation of liberty. 
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant who is charged with 
an offense for which the punishment may be death, the court shall appoint two or more attorneys to 
represent such defendant and shall make a finding on the record based on the requirements set forth 
below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of capital cases. In making its determination, 
the court shall ensure that the experience of counsel who are under consideration for appointment 
have met the following minimum requirements: 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys in 's • • idk i M I* H »H < J.-C^ wir-.ni \wc nnst 
four years or twenty-five felony cases total; 
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a capital 
or a felony homicide case which was tried to a jury and which went to final verdict; 
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed or taught within the past five years 
an approved continuing legal education course or courses at least eight hours of which deal, in 
substantial part, with the trial of death penalty cases; and 
(4) the experience ••*-**" >* : • <r . •• -\-.. : <:- -.; . •. • ;nm live years in the active 
practice of law. 
(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a capital case, the court shouUi aUo 
consider at least the following factors: 
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration have previously appeared as counsel 
or co-counsel in a capital case; 
(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have sufficient time and support and can 
dedicate those resources to the representation of the defendant in the capital case now pending 
before the court with undivided loyalty to the defendant; 
(3) the extent to windi the attorneys under consideration have engaged in the active practice of 
criminal law in the past five years; 
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being considered; and 
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to be appointed will 
fairly, efficiently and effectively provide representation to the defendant. 
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to death, the court shall appoint one or 
more attorneys to represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is 
proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be found proficient to represent on appeal persons 
sentenced to death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following 
requirements: 
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least three felony appeals; and 
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past five years an approved 
continuing legal education course which deals, in substantial part, with the trial or appeal of death 
penalty cases. 
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent such 
petitioner at post-conviction trial and on post-conviction appeal and shall make a finding that 
counsel is qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases. To be found 
qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following 
requirements: 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at least three felony or 
post-conviction appeals; 
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a post-
conviction case at the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated proficiency in the 
area of post-conviction litigation; 
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended and completed or taught within the 
past five years an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in substantial part, with 
the trial and appeal of death penalty cases or with the prosecution or defense of post-conviction 
proceedings in death penalty cases; 
(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to judgment or verdict three civil jury or 
felony cases within the past four years or ten cases total; and 
(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five years in the 
active practice of law. 
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall 
not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively represented the 
defendant at trial or on appeal. 
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title 
77. 
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be paid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-202(2)(c). 
Utah R. Evid. 507 
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter 
or communication waives the privilege if the person or a predecessor while holder of the privilege 
voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or 
communication, or fails to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does 
not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication. 
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the 
holder of the privilege if disclosure was 
(1) compelled erroneously or 
(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege. 
(c)(1) Comment or Inference Not Permitted. The claim of privilege, whether in the present proceeding or 
upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. N o inference may be 
drawn therefrom. 
(2) Claiming Privilege Without Knowledge of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the 
jury. 
(3) jury Instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse inference 
from the claim of privilege is entitled to instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom. 
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do not apply when the privilege 
against self-incrimination has been invoked. 
Ruling Denying Motion for Relief 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah' State Prison 
Warden, 
Respondent. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030106629 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
This case is before the court on Petitioner's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment. The court has thoroughly reviewed the parties' 
memoranda, the relevant case law, and all applicable statutory 
provisions. Additionally, the court has considered the oral 
arguments provided by counsel at the hearing on the motion and the 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. Now being fully 
advised, the court makes the following ruling: 
Applicable Rules 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discov-
ered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reason[] (1) . . . not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. . . . The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
nnor?n^ 
Procedural Hi s tory 
On February 25, 1986, the body of Maurine Hunsaker was found 
by a hiker at Storm Mountain. Following a month-long jury trial, 
on March 8, 1988, Petitioner was found guilty of first degree 
murder, a capital offense, and aggravated kidnapping, a first 
degree felony, in the death of Ms. Hunsaker. He subsequently 
waived the jury for the penalty phase of the trial and was 
sentenced to death by the trial judge. Petitioner filed a motion 
for a new trial alleging that errors in the recording and tran-
scribing of the trial rendered the record unsatisfactory for 
purposes of appellate review. This motion was denied by the trial 
court and Petitioner appealed the denial to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial and ordered 
Petitioner to proceed with his direct appeal on the merits. See 
State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 242 (Utah 1992). In Petitioner's 
direct appeal on the merits, he raised numerous claims of error, 
all of which were ultimately denied by the Court. The Court 
affirmed the jury's guilty verdict and the trial court's imposition 
of the death penalty. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 406-07 
(Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). 
On April 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief. An Amended Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief was filed 
on May 2, 1995. The amended petition included seventy-three claims 
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for relief, including claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. On June 26, 1995, Respondent filed his Answer to Amended 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post Conviction Relief as 
well as a motion for discovery. On November 13, 1995, Respondent 
moved the trial court to dismiss the first seventy-one claims on 
the ground that they had previously been raised and rejected by the 
Utah Supreme Court. Respondent did not, however, request that the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims be dismissed. Petitioner 
responded to this motion on December 11, 1995. 
On December 13, 1995, Respondent moved the trial court for 
permission to conduct discovery and Petitioner responded on January 
10, 1996. On February 7, 1996, Petitioner requested the trial 
court to direct Respondent to provide funds for investigating his 
claims of innocence and other substantial claims. Respondent 
objected and filed its response on March 18, 1996. On April 3, 
1996, the trial court signed an order deferring ruling on Respon-
dent's motion to dismiss until after an evidentiary hearing could 
be conducted with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. In April 1996, the trial court granted the motion for 
permission to conduct discovery, although the order was not filed 
until June 12, 1996. 
On May 3, 1996, Petitioner motioned the trial court to review 
the affidavit of Ron Lax in camera as evidence in support of 
Petitioner's claim of innocence as well as his claims that trial 
and appellate counsel had been ineffective. On May 17, 1996, 
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Respondent filed his First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner. 
On June 12, 1996, the trial court entered an order awarding 
Petitioner the sum of $2,000 for investigation fees. On June 19, 
1996, Petitioner filed a Motion for Protective Order and a Motion 
to Stay Depositions. Petitioner did not timely file answers to the 
interrogatories submitted by Respondent on May 17, 1996. On July 
8, 1996 Respondent filed a Motion for Order Compelling Answers to 
Interrogatories. For the next several months, Petitioner sought 
protection from the trial court with respect to Respondent's 
attempts to discover files related to Petitioner's case that were 
in the possession of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. On 
August 23, 1996, Respondent sought the trial court's permission to 
depose Petitioner. On September 16, 1996, the trial court 
reaffirmed its order awarding monies to Petitioner and granted 
Respondent's motions to compel interrogatory answers and to depose 
Petitioner. The trial court ordered Petitioner to complete his 
answers to the first interrogatories by October 9, 1996, which he 
failed to do. On October 22, 1996, Respondent moved for sanctions. 
While the motion for sanctions was pending Petitioner served his 
answers to the first set of interrogatories on January 10, 1997. 
On February 3, 1997, Petitioner moved for an increase in the 
investigation funds and on February 18, 1997, Respondent filed his 
response in opposition. Petitioner's motion was denied by the 
trial court on February 24, 1997. On March 6, 1997, Judge Uno was 
assigned to Petitioner's post-conviction case. In May 1997, all 
4 
proceedings were voluntarily stayed until after July 1, 1997, which 
was the effective date for new legislation governing the appoint-
ment and payment of counsel and investigative resources in post-
conviction cases where a petitioner has been sentenced to death. 
On October 27, 1997 and December 16, 1997, pursuant to the new 
legislation, Petitioner requested Judge Uno to appoint counsel 
qualified under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
handle post-conviction capital cases. On November 3, 1997, at the 
hearing on the motion, Judge Uno required Petitioner's counsel to 
prepare a list of Rule 8 qualified attorneys with affidavits 
detailing their background and qualifications. After Petitioner's 
counsel failed to timely create a list for the court, additional 
time was granted. On December 3, 1997, Kenneth R. Brown filed an 
affidavit related to the appointment of Rule 8 qualified counsel 
which indicated that he could not take the case and, moreover, that 
Petitioner had uninvestigated claims of innocence, that a mitiga-
tion investigation had never been performed, and that it would cost 
approximately $50,000 to properly investigate Petitioner's case. 
Relevant Facts 
On March 3, 1998, Judge Uno filed an order appointing Ed Brass 
to represent Petitioner. Mr. Brass believed he was appointed for 
the sole purpose of representing Petitioner at the evidentiary 
hearing. Petitioner asserts that Mr. Brass was appointed to assist 
him in seeking relief from his death sentence and conviction. 
5 
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Petitioner also asserts that Judge Uno never inquired into Mr. 
Brass's qualifications under Rule 8. On March 13, 1998, Judge Uno 
entered a scheduling order which, among other things, gave 
Petitioner until April 16, 1998 to amend his petition for post-
conviction relief and set the discovery cut-off date for October 
15, 1998. The amended petition was not filed on the date ordered 
and Judge Uno gave Petitioner until August 17, 1998 to file his 
amended petition. A multiple page amended petition was filed on 
August 31, 1998. Respondent's answer and Motion to Dismiss Second 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on September 
25, 1998. On October 10, 1998, Respondent moved the trial court to 
extend the discovery cut-off deadline from October 15, 1998 to 
December 15, 1998. This extension was granted by Judge Uno on 
October 29, 1998. 
On November 24, 1998, Respondent provided notice of his intent 
to depose Petitioner and a December 10, 1998, date was set for the 
deposition. The day before the deposition, Respondent asserts that 
Petitioner refused to be deposed without providing any legal reason 
for the refusal. The deposition was ultimately cancelled. On 
December 16, 1998, the parties stipulated to extend the discovery 
cut-off date and on December 22, 1998, Respondent filed a motion to 
compel Petitioner's deposition. Petitioner did not respond to this 
motion. 
In a January 6, 1999, memorandum decision, Judge Uno ruled on 
Respondent's motion to dismiss filed on November 13, 1995. The 
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court dismissed claims 1 through 71 on the grounds that these 
claims had been previously adjudicated and because no unusual 
circumstances justified granting a hearing on the previously 
adjudicated claims. On February 28, 1999, the time for the 
production of discovery was extended to March 26, 1999. On June 
11, 1999, Judge Uno granted Respondent's December 22, 1998, motion 
to compel Petitioner's deposition. Because of scheduling con-
flicts, Respondent motioned the court to strike the discovery cut-
off deadline and a new scheduling order was entered on July 19, 
1999 which gave the parties until December 31, 1999 to complete 
discovery. Petitioner's deposition was ultimately scheduled for 
November 5, 1999. Mr. Brass did not attend the deposition, but Ms. 
Julie George was present representing Petitioner. Although 
Petitioner answered several preliminary questions, he followed 
counsel's advice and invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to 
answer questions related to conversations with his trial counsel. 
On December 3, 1999, Respondent filed a Second Motion to 
Compel Petitioner's Deposition or Impose Sanctions. Petitioner did 
not respond to this motion. On December 23, 1999, Respondent filed 
a motion to strike the discovery cut-off date. Judge Uno granted 
this motion on February 28, 2000, and on March 13, 2000, Respon-
dent's second motion to compel the deposition was granted. After 
the passage of several months, Respondent filed a Motion to Permit 
Additional Interrogatories on October 9, 2000. Judge Uno granted 
this motion on December 20, 2000. Petitioner, however, failed to 
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answer the second i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . On February 15, 2001, Respon-
dent f i l ed a Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. Pe t i t i one r did 
not respond to t h i s motion. In an order entered on March 28, 2001, 
Judge Uno ordered Pe t i t ione r to immediately provide the discovery 
responses requested by Respondent. P e t i t i o n e r f a i l ed to comply 
with the c o u r t ' s order and, on April 19, 2001, Respondent moved for 
sanct ions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure. 
This motion asked the court to p roh ib i t P e t i t i o n e r from introducing 
evidence to support his claims beyond what was al ready ava i lab le in 
the record of the underlying criminal case and in the discovery 
tha t had been disclosed previous to tha t po in t . Pe t i t i one r fa i led 
to respond to the motion for sanc t ions . 
On June 27, 2001, Judge Uno issued h i s Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Respondent 's Motion for Utah 
R. Civ. P. 37 Sanct ions. On October 29, 2001, Respondent f i l ed his 
Motion for Summary Judgment. P e t i t i o n e r f a i l ed to respond to t h i s 
motion and fa i l ed to ask for add i t iona l time to respond. On 
December 7, 2001, Judge Uno granted the motion for summary 
judgment, and on January 11, 2002, the court dismissed P e t i t i o n e r ' s 
p e t i t i o n for pos t -convic t ion r e l i e f . 1 
xOn February 11, 2002, P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of appea l , but f a i l e d 
t o f i l e a docke t ing s ta tement w i th in the t ime r e q u i r e d by Rule 9 of the Utah 
Rules of A p p e l l a t e Procedure . The Supreme Court a l lowed P e t i t i o n e r to avoid 
d i s m i s s a l of h i s appea l by f i l i n g a t r a n s c r i p t r e q u e s t with the Court . 
P e t i t i o n e r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he did not need a t r a n s c r i p t and, in a l e t t e r da ted 
June 24, 2002, t he Court s e t the b r i e f i n g schedule i n the c a s e . P e t i t i o n e r was 
given u n t i l August 6, 2002 to f i l e h i s b r i e f . He f a i l e d t o meet t h i s dead l i ne 
and reques ted an ex t ens ion to October 16, 2002 t o f i l e h i s b r i e f . This r eques t 
was g ran ted on August 8, 2002. Despi te t h i s g r a n t of a d d i t i o n a l t ime , P e t i t i o n e r 
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On April 11, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and indicated in the pleading that he would supplement the 
motion with a memorandum setting forth the specific grounds for 
relief- On January 10, 2003, Respondent moved the trial court for 
permission to file a late response to Petitioner's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment. Petitioner did not respond to this motion and on 
January 29, 2003, Respondent filed a notice to submit. Prior to 
the filing of the Respondent's motion, Judge Leslie Lewis was 
assigned to the case. On March 6, 2003, Judge Lewis recused 
herself. Petitioner's case was then re-assigned to Judge Pat Brian 
on March 27, 2003. 
There is no indication that Respondent's motion to file a late 
response was ever decided by the trial court. On August 12, 2003, 
Elizabeth Hunt appeared as counsel for Petitioner and filed a 
memorandum supporting the motion Petitioner filed on April 11, 
2002, to set aside Judge Uno's order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Respondent. On August 15, 2003, Petitioner moved the 
court for an order temporarily vacating the summary judgment. On 
August 29, 2003, Respondent filed his response to Petitioner's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment. On September 9, 2003, Mr. Brass 
withdrew as counsel. On September 15, 2003, Respondent filed his 
failed to file a brief. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal and Petitioner 
failed to respond. On November 21, 2002, the Supreme Court dismissed Peti-
tioner's appeal, but indicated that if his brief was filed within ten days, the 
appeal would automatically be reinstated. Petitioner failed to file a brief and, 
on December 19, 2002, the Court entered its notice of decision dismissing 
Petitioner's appeal. On December 30, 2002, Petitioner moved the Court to 
reinstate his appeal. This motion was denied. 
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response to the motion to temporarily vacate the summary judgment 
order. On September 17, 2003, Petitioner filed his reply memoran-
dum in support of his motion to set aside. Oral arguments were 
held before Judge Brian on September 22, 2003 and the motion was 
taken under advisement. On September 25, 2003, Petitioner filed a 
Memorandum Regarding Coleman v. Thompson. Respondent filed a 
motion to strike Petitioner's memorandum addressing the Coleman 
case and Petitioner filed his response in opposition to Respon-
dent's motion on October 3, 2003. 
On November 7, 2003, Judge Brian scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing for the limited purpose of obtaining evidence related to 
any communication between Petitioner and Mr. Brass or Petitioner 
and the court concerning the status and progress of Petitioner's 
post-conviction case. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner 
filed a Memorandum Regarding T.S. v. State on December 10, 2003. 
Respondent responded on December 24, 2003 and Petitioner replied on 
December 29, 2003. The evidentiary hearing was ultimately held on 
January 15-16, 2004. 
Summary of the Parties' Arguments 
Petitioner' s Claims 
Petitioner asserts that, in furtherance of justice, Judge 
Uno's order entered on January 11, 2002, granting Respondent's 
motion for summary judgment and dismissing the petition for post-
conviction relief, should be set aside. He argues that the 
10 
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ineffective assistance of counsel by Mr. Brass entitles him to 
relief under any one of four separate subsections of Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Petitioner argues 
that (1) under subsection (b) (1) he should not be punished for Mr. 
Brass's ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the post-
conviction case because Petitioner has meritorious claims and 
defenses, including a claim of actual innocence, and Respondent 
will not suffer substantial prejudice if the order is set aside; 
(2) under subsection (b)(4) Mr. Brass's ineffective assistance of 
counsel resulted in a fundamental denial of due process of law, 
thereby rendering Judge Uno's order void; (3) under subsection 
(b)(5), as a result of Mr. Brass's ineffective assistance of 
counsel, it would not be equitable to allow Judge Uno's order to 
apply prospectively; and (4) under subsection (b)(6), Mr. Brass's 
ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in grossly negligent 
representation and a denial of procedural due process. 
Respondent's Response 
Respondent argues that although Petitioner asserts that he is 
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) (1), (4), (5), and (6), because 
each of the allegations he raises relies upon the ineffective 
assistance of counsel provided by Mr. Brass, the court should only 
determine the appropriateness of Rule 60(b) relief by considering 
whether Mr. Brass's ineffective assistance of counsel was the 
result of "mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect" under 
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subsection (b) (1) . When subsection (b) (1) applies, the limitations 
period for seeking relief is three months and a litigant cannot 
rely upon another subsection to avoid this limitation period. 
According to Respondent, based upon the subsection (b) (1) limita-
tions period, Petitioner failed to timely file his motion to set 
aside and, therefore, the court is without jurisdiction to consider 
the motion. 
Although Petitioner filed a pleading within a reasonable time 
as required under the rules, this pleading did not comport with the 
particularity requirement of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure insofar as it failed to articulate any grounds for relief 
or provide any authority or legal analysis in support of the relief 
he was seeking. As a result, the pleading merely provided notice 
that Petitioner intended to seek Rule 60(b) relief, but it was not 
itself a motion for Rule 60(b) relief. Additionally, while the 
pleading indicated that a memorandum in support would be forthcom-
ing, this memorandum was not filed until thirteen months later and 
relied on information that had only recently been discovered. 
Accordingly, Respondent contends that this memorandum must be 
viewed as a new motion to set aside the judgment. Since it was not 
filed within a reasonable time, the court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider Petitioner's request for relief. 
Respondent also argues that even if the motion to set aside 
was timely filed, it should be denied on the merits. First, under 
subsection (b) (1), any ineffective assistance of counsel by Mr. 
12 
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Brass in his representation must be borne by Petitioner because 
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that negligence on the 
part of an attorney is attributable to the client. Petitioner also 
cannot show that Judge Uno's entry of the order granting summary 
judgment was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable 
neglect on the part of Mr. Brass. On the contrary, Mr. Brass 
admitted that the inadequacy of his representation was the result 
of wilful failures on his part. Moreover, although Petitioner has 
asserted numerous claims, including claims of innocence, he has 
failed to demonstrate a specific factual basis to support any of 
the claims he believes are sufficiently meritorious to set aside 
the summary judgment order. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled 
to relief under subsection (b) (1) . 
Second, under subsection (b)(4), Respondent argues that 
Petitioner has not shown that Judge Uno's order is void. Specifi-
cally, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Mr. Brass's ineffective 
assistance of counsel resulted in Judge Uno entering the summary 
judgment order in violation of Petitioner's right to due process of 
law. According to Respondent, while inmates have a federal 
constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts, they do 
not have a constitutional right to counsel. Mr. Brass's ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel did not affect Petitioner's constitu-
tional right to meaningful court access or result in a denial of 
due process. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 
subsection (b) (4) . 
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Third, Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot demonstrate 
under subsection (b)(5) that Judge Uno's order has prospective 
application and that events have occurred that render enforcement 
of the order inequitable. While there may be collateral conse-
quences for Petitioner as a result of Judge Uno's order granting 
summary judgment, this does not constitute "prospective applica-
tion" under subsection (b) (5) as that term has been interpreted in 
Utah case law. Moreover, Petitioner's allegation that Mr. Brass 
was unaware that his ineffective assistance of counsel would have 
adverse consequences to Petitioner's case and that Petitioner was 
unaware of his counsel's deficiencies does not justify the 
conclusion that enforcement of Judge Uno's order would be inequita-
ble. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under 
subsection (b)(5). 
Finally, Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot rely upon 
subsection (b)(6) for relief because he cannot show that there is 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." First, Petitioner's allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel by Mr. Brass are the same types of allega-
tions he raises under subsection (b) (1) . Simply reasserting these 
allegations under subsection (b)(6) does not constitute "any other 
reason" justifying relief. Second, Petitioner does not, and 
cannot, demonstrate that his due process rights were violated by 
Mr. Brass. The fact that Petitioner did not receive notice of 
Judge Uno's order is not a violation of due process. Third, 
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although Petitioner alleges that Mr. Brass's representation 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner is not 
entitled to effective representation in a civil proceeding that 
collaterally challenges his conviction and death sentence. Fourth, 
although Petitioner asserts that he has meritorious claims, 
including a claim of innocence that further investigation may 
develop, he has not provided any specific evidence that would 
suggest that additional investigation would prove fruitful. Fifth, 
Petitioner also requests relief on the ground that if Judge Uno's 
order is not set aside, all of his federal avenues for review will 
be defaulted. However, Petitioner may still raise issues related 
to claims he exhausted on direct appeal and he may still raise 
issues related to his claim of actual innocence. For all of these 
reasons, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to 
relief under subsection (b)(6). 
Petitioner's Reply 
In a lengthy reply memorandum, Petitioner provides various 
rejoinders to many of Respondent's arguments. After setting forth 
a litany of failures alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by 
Mr. Brass, Petitioner argues that he personally tried to avoid 
unnecessary delay in relation to discovery and was cooperative 
during the deposition process. Moreover, there were several 
instances where Respondent was responsible for prolonging the case 
by asking for continuances. With respect to the timeliness issue, 
15 
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Petitioner contends that the motion to set aside was filed within 
the three month period mandated for subsection (b)(1) and within a 
reasonable time as required by subsections (b) (4), (b) (5), and 
(b) (6) . No authority supports Respondent's position that memoranda 
in support of the motion must also be filed within the limitations 
period. In any case, not filing the supporting documents within 
the limitations period should be excused because Petitioner was 
unaware of Mr. Brass's ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Alternatively, Petitioner argues that the filing of the supporting 
memorandum may be viewed as a "supplemental" Rule 60(b) motion that 
was filed within a reasonable time under subsections (b) (4), 
(b) (5), and (b) (6) . Any delay was necessary to allow Petitioner's 
present counsel to assess the case. Additionally, while Respondent 
argues that, because the motion to set aside fails to comport with 
the particularity requirements of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and, therefore, it is not a motion but merely a pleading 
indicating an intention to file a motion, the court's jurisdiction 
does not turn on whether there has been a technical compliance with 
Rule 7. 
As for Respondent's argument that the negligence of an 
attorney is attributable to the client, Petitioner argues that this 
agency theory does not apply to cases involving an indigent capital 
defendant with appointed counsel. The general rationale for 
attributing the negligence of an attorney to the client is that the 
client has voluntarily chosen his or her attorney and must, 
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therefore, bear the consequences of the chosen attorney's non-
performance. Petitioner argues, however, that this rationale 
simply does not apply to his case because he is indigent and did 
not choose Mr. Brass to represent him. Moreover, Petitioner 
asserts that in cases of gross negligence on the part of an 
attorney, courts generally do not hold the client responsible, 
particularly where the client himself has not been negligent or 
indifferent. Petitioner argues that he consistently asked his 
attorneys, including Mr. Brass, to investigate his case and raise 
all valid issues. 
Petitioner also argues that in considering the issue of 
prejudice under Rule 60(b), the court should recognize that it is 
Petitioner, and not Respondent, who has been prejudiced by the 
delay in the case because he has yet to be represented by competent 
counsel and have his case properly investigated. Although society 
has an interest in the finality of judgments, that interest is not 
superior to society's interest in ensuring the reliability of 
Petitioner's conviction and death sentence. The same is true in 
relation to the interests of the victim representatives. While 
their interests are important, they do not trump society's 
interests in ensuring the reliability of a capital conviction and 
death sentence. 
Finally, Petitioner asserts that because he has meritorious 
claims, he is entitled to relief from Judge Uno's order. Although 
Respondent argues that Petitioner must set forth a specific factual 
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basis for the meritorious claims he asserts, Utah appellate courts 
only require the presentation of a clear and specific proffer of a 
claim that, if proven, would preclude recovery by the opposing 
party. If this is done, the litigant has shown a meritorious claim 
for the purposes of setting aside a default judgment. According to 
Petitioner, the claims asserted in his amended petition relating to 
ineffective assistance of counsel and the right to a jury trial 
satisfy the above standard for a meritorious claim. 
Legal Analysis 
Introduction 
The general policy underlying Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is to strike a balance between two competing 
objectives of the legal system: "the strong public policy interest 
in recognizing the finality of judgments with the equally strong 
policy interest in attempting to ensure that disputes are decided 
on their merits and that justice is done." United States v. 
Kavser-Roth Corp., 103 F. Supp.2d 74, 78 (Dist. R.I. 2000). See 
also Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Assoc, 657 P.2d 1304, 
1306 (Utah 1982) (under Rule 60(b), N\ . . final judgments should 
not be lightly disturbed and . . . unjust judgments should not be 
allowed to stand . . . .") • In light of the balancing that must be 
done, the relief available under Rule 60(b) N'is a creature of 
equity designed to relieve against the harshness of enforcing a 
judgment, which may occur through procedural difficulties, the 
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wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the 
presentation of a claim or defense." Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953), See also Olsen v. Cumminqs, 565 
P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977) ("Because an application to set aside 
a default is equitable in nature and is addressed to the conscience 
of the court, all the attendant circumstances should be consid-
ered."); Kettner v. Snow, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1962) (A party may 
be relieved from a final judgment "only where it is made to appear 
that for one or more of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b) justice 
has been so thwarted that equity and good conscience demand that . 
. . relief be granted."). 
Because Rule 60(b) relief is equitable in nature, trial courts 
are entitled to exercise broad discretion "to balance the equities 
on a case-by-case basis, including such considerations as the 
preference to allow the presentation of all claims and defenses, 
any delay or unfairness of a party's conduct, the need for finality 
of judgments, and the respective hardships in denying or granting 
relief." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 n.2 (Utah 1986). See 
also Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (UtahCt. App. 1989) ("The 
trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for 
relief from judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), and its determi-
nation will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."). The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that trial courts "should be generally 
indulgent toward setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the [movant's] failure[s] and when 
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timely application is made. Where there is doubt about whether a 
default should be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor 
of doing so." Katz, 732 P.2d at 93. See also Helgesen v. 
Invanqumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) P[D]iscretion should 
be exercised in furtherance of justice and should incline towards 
granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the party may 
have a hearing.7'). On the other hand, xx[t]he interests of the 
[opposing parties] should also be taken into consideration, and the 
judgment should not be set aside if to do so would work an 
injustice or inequity to them." Pitts v. Pine Meadows Ranch, Inc./ 
589 P.2d 767, 768-69 (Utah 1978). Generally, 
each case must . . . depend upon its own peculiar facts 
and circumstances. "No general rule can be laid down 
respecting the discretion to be exercised in setting 
aside or refusing to set aside a judgment by default . . 
. but the discretion should always be so exercised as to 
promote the ends of justice." 
Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855, 859 (Utah 1979) (quoting Utah 
Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 1033, 1037 (Utah 1898)). 
Applicable Standard Under Rule 60(b) 
With few exceptions, in order to prevail on a Rule 60(b) 
motion, the movant must show that (1) the motion was timely filed; 
(2) at least one of the six reasons specified in the rule applies 
that would justify relief; and (3) there is a meritorious claim 
worthy of adjudication. See Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-556 (Utah 1983). This showing must 
be by a preponderance of the evidence. Johns v. Shulsen# 717 P.2d 
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1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) pit is universally recognized that the 
standard of proof in civil actions is by a preponderance of the 
evidence.") . Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that these 
requirements must be considered in a serial manner. That is, the 
court must first determine whether the motion to set aside is 
timely and that there is a justifiable basis for relief under one 
of the Rule 60(b) subsections before determining whether there has 
been a proper showing of a meritorious claim. Erickson v. 
Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994) 
PxOnce timeliness and a basis for relief under Rule 60(b) . . . 
have been established, the sole issue is whether, as a matter of 
law, a defendant's proposed Answer contains a defense which is 
entitled to be tried.'" (quoting Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1059 
(Durham, J., dissenting))). 
Timeliness 
Any motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) must be filed "within 
a reasonable time and for reason[] (1) . . . , not more than 3 
months after the judgement, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). In cases where subsection (b) (1) 
applies, a movant may not rely upon another subsection simply to 
avoid the three month limitation period. See, e.g./ Laub, 657 P.2d 
at 1308; Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 429 
(Utah 1982); Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern 
Properties, 838 P. 2d 672, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Richins v. 
Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1991). "[A] a reasonable time under rule 60(b) 'depends upon the 
facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in 
finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the 
litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice 
to other parties.'" Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 
1993) (quoting Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 261 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)). "xIn general . . . the moving party need show only that 
she acted diligently once the basis for relief became available, 
and that [any] delay in seeking relief [does] not cause undue 
hardship to the opposing party.'" Workman v. Nagle Construction/ 
802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting J. Friedenthal, M. 
Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 12.6 at 574 (1985)). However, 
with respect to subsection (b)(4), "'there is no time limit on an 
attack on a judgment as void.'" Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 
290 (Utah 1986) (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 2862 (1973)). 
Grounds for Relief Under Rule 60(b) 
In the context of the present case, four separate grounds for 
relief are asserted under Rule 60(b)(1), (4), (5), and (6). Rule 
60(b)(1) permits relief if the movant can demonstrate that the 
final judgment or order was the result of "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). 
Although the rule is silent on the meaning of these terms, most 
federal circuit courts of appeal have held that deliberate or 
willful inaction in a case can never be mistake, inadvertence, or 
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excusable neglect. See 12 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.41[l][c] 
(Matthew Bender 3d ed.). Although relief under subsection (b)(1) 
may be possible where inaction occurs based upon a reasonable, good 
faith interpretation of the law that turns out to be erroneous, see 
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 1116, 11 P.3d 277, "[gJross carelessness, 
ignorance of the rules, or ignorance of the law are insufficient 
bases for 60(b) (1) relief." Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 
6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. 
v. Brunswick Assoc, 507 U.S. 380, 392(1993) ("Inadvertence, 
ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not 
usually constitute ^excusable' neglect."). According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, in order to demonstrate that a default was the 
result of excusable neglect, the movant must show that his attorney 
exercised due diligence, i.e., that the conduct of his attorney was 
consistent with how a reasonably prudent attorney under similar 
circumstances would have acted. See Mini Spas v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) ("We have heretofore defined 
'excusable neglect' as the exercise of Mue diligence' by a 
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances."). 
Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief where the movant demonstrates 
that the judgment is void. In the context of this subsection, 
"a judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or 
because some irregularity inhered in its rendition. It is 
void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter or of the parties or if the 
court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process/' 
Richins, 817 P.2d at 385 (quoting Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobey, 
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558 P.2d 101, 104 (Kan. 1976)). But see Bish' s Sheet Metal Co. v. 
Luras, 359 P.2d 21, 22 (Utah 1961) (noting that a claim of a lack 
of due process could fall under the then equivalent of Rule 
60(b) (6) because relief from an order or judgment on the basis of 
a lack of due process is not expressly provided for by any other 
subsection of Rule 60(b)). Moreover, a motion filed under 
subsection (4) 
"differs markedly from motions under the other clauses of 
Rule 60(b). There is no question of discretion on the 
part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b) (4). 
Nor is there any requirement, as there usually is when 
default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the 
moving party show that he has a meritorious defense. 
Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining 
which it is may well present a difficult question, but 
when that question is resolved, the court must act 
accordingly." 
Garcia, 712 P.2d at 290-291 (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2862 (1973)). See also Orner v. 
Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (when a motion to set 
aside is properly invoked, "relief is not a discretionary matter; 
it is mandatory."); Recreational Properties, Inc. v. Southwest 
Mortgage Serv. Corp., 804 F.2d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1986) ("When, 
however, the motion is based on a void judgment under rule 
60(b)(4), the district court has no discretion—the judgment is 
either void or it is not."). 
Relief may be obtained under Rule 60(b) (5) if the prospective 
application of a judgment or order would no longer be equitable. 
Although "every court order causes at least some reverberations 
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into the future, and has, in that literal sense, some prospective 
effect [,] . . . [tjhat a court's action has continuing consequences 
. . . does not necessarily mean that it has ^prospective applica-
tion' for the purposes of Rule 60(b) (5)." Twelve John Does v. 
District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
Rather, the standard for "determining whether an order or judgment 
has prospective application within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5) is 
whether it is ^executory' or involves ythe supervision of changing 
conduct or conditions.'" Id. at 1139 (quoting Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431 (1855) and United 
States v. Swift & Co. , 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)). See also Stokors 
S.A. v. Morrison, 147 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); 
Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1995) (same) ; 
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1275 (2nd Cir. 1994) (same). 
Thus, unless, for example, a judgment compels a party to perform or 
not to perform a future act or requires the court to engage in 
continual supervision over the parties in the case, the judgment is 
not "prospective" for purposes of Rule 60(b) (5). See Twelve John 
Does, 841 F.2d at 1138. In addition, the movant must also 
demonstrate that the circumstances, whether legal or factual, which 
were present at the time of the judgment was entered have changed, 
or new ones have since arisen, that render enforcement of the 
judgment inequitable. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 
502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992) (requiring party moving for Rule 60(b)(5) 
relief to show ua significant change either in factual conditions 
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or in law . . . . " ) ; System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees' 
Department v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (same). 
Rule 60(b) (6) is the residuary provision and allows for final 
judgments to be set aside for "any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 
Subsection (b) (6) may be relied upon only if all other subsections 
under Rule 60(b) are inapplicable. See Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306 
(when subsection (b) (6) is relied upon, "the reason must be one 
other than those listed in subdivisions (1) through ([5])."). 
Moreover, this subsection "'should be cautiously and sparingly 
invoked by the Court only in unusual and exceptional instances.'" 
Id. at 1307-08 (quoting Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F. Supp. 332, 334 
(E.D. Okla. 1968)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has 
indicated that while subsection (b) (6) "does not particularize the 
factors that justify relief, . . . we have previously noted that it 
provides courts with authority 'adequate to enable them to vacate 
judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish 
justice, ' while also cautioning that it should only be applied in 
'extraordinary circumstances.'" Lilieberg v. Health Services 
Acguisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988) (quoting Klapprott v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-615 (1949) and Ackermann v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950)). See also Cashner v. Freedom 
Stores, 98 F.3d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[A] district court may 
grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion only in extraordinary circumstances. 
and only when necessary to accomplish justice."). 
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Meritorious Claim 
In order "to prevent the necessity of judicial review of 
questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous," 
Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1060 (Durham, J., dissenting), the Utah 
Supreme Court has held "that relief from judgment requires a 
showing of a meritorious defense to a claim." Lund, 2000 UT 75 at 
$28. "A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default 
judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried." Erickson, 882 
P.2d at 1149. Based upon this standard, "where a party presents a 
clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would 
preclude total or partial recovery by the [opposing party], it has 
adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense for the 
purposes of its motion to set aside a default judgment." Lund, 
2000 UT 75 at $29. Thus, even general denials satisfy the 
requirement of a meritorious defense. See Erickson, 882 P.2d at 
1149 ("These general denials, if proven at trial, would preclude 
recovery by [the opposing party] and are therefore sufficient to 
satisfy the meritorious defense requirement."). 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
A. Timeliness of the Motion 
On January 11, 2002, Judge Uno granted Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed Petitioner's petition for post-
conviction relief. Three months later, on April 11, 2002, 
Petitioner filed his Motion to Set Aside Judgment. However, the 
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motion indicated that relief was being sought pursuant to "Rule 
60(D)," an obvious misidentification of Rule 60(b) . Additionally, 
the motion failed to provide any grounds for setting aside the 
judgment, and Petitioner failed to specify any subsection under 
Rule 60(b) he would be relying upon for relief. Although the 
motion did indicate that a subsequent memorandum would be filed 
setting forth specific grounds for relief, his Memorandum Support-
ing Motion to Set Aside Judgment was not filed until August 12, 
2003, sixteen months after the initial motion was filed. 
As Respondent correctly points out, Rule 7 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure mandates that an "application to the court for 
an order shall be by motion which . . . shall be in writing [and] 
shall state with particularity the grounds thereof." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(b) (1) (emphasis added). Moreover, Rule 4-501 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration expressly requires motions to "be accompa-
nied by a memorandum of points and authorities . . . relied upon in 
support of the motion." Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-501(1) (A). 
Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Judgment clearly failed to satisfy 
either of these rules; the motion neither "state[d] with particu-
larity" the grounds for relief, nor was it "accompanied" by a 
memorandum of points and authorities. While it may be true that 
the intent of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to "liberalize both 
pleading and procedure," Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. 
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996), the failures exhibited in 
Petitioner's motion are in direct contravention of the overall 
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purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Judicial 
Administration, which is "to achieve . . . the development of a 
more efficient and effective judicial system . . . ." Forward, 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. Such deficiencies effectively undermine the 
efficient and proper administration of justice by preventing an 
opposing party from receiving what she is entitled to under the 
rules, namely, "notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to 
meet them." Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963). 
Respondent argues that Petitioner's failure to comply with 
Rule 7 renders his Rule 60(b) motion untimely and therefore, the 
court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion. In 
making this argument, Respondent argues that a pleading which on 
its face is a motion for some type of relief that is filed within 
the statutory limitations period is not actually filed within the 
limitations period if the pleading fails to state with particular-
ity the grounds for relief.2 Based upon this principle, the court 
must either interpret Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Judgment as 
not being what it clearly indicates it is and, therefore, find that 
no "motion" was actually filed, or the court must accept the 
pleading as a motion to set aside and then engage in some type of 
legal fiction in order to find that the "filing" of the motion did 
not actually occur on the date it was filed, but on a later date, 
2In his response memorandum, Respondent asserts that a movant does not 
actually seek relief under Rule 60(b) until he complies with the rules by stating 
with particularity the grounds for relief. 
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namely, when the particularized grounds for relief were filed. The 
court, however, has been unable to find any case, either in Utah or 
elsewhere, suggesting that Respondent's position is based on any 
established principle of law; nor has the court been able to find 
any case suggesting the validity of the more general claim that the 
Rule 7 particularity requirement is a necessary prerequisite for 
timeliness. Rather, the court finds that pleading with particular-
ity is not a logically necessary component of timeliness and, 
therefore, a motion may be filed in a timely manner despite being 
insufficient for various reasons including the fact that it lacks 
particularity. Consistent with this view, the court finds that 
Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Judgment was timely filed within 
the three month limitations period imposed by Rule 60(b). 
The court also finds that, although the motion was sufficient 
to put Respondent on notice that Judge Uno's order was being 
challenged, it was clearly deficient in that it failed to state 
with particularity the grounds for relief as required by Rule 7. 
This raises the issue of whether a failure to satisfy the particu-
larity requirement deprives the court of jurisdiction over a 
timely-filed motion. See generally Registration Control Systems, 
Inc. v. Compusvstems, Inc., 922 F.2d 805 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (distin-
guishing between timeliness and particularity in deciding jurisdic-
tional nature of Rule 7); Nations v. Bonner Building Supply, 746 
P.2d 1027 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (ruling that in context of motion 
for a new trial, timeliness and particularity are separate 
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jurisdictional requirements). Although Utah appellate courts have 
yet to consider this question, federal courts of appeal that have 
addressed this question are split on its resolution. See, e.g., 
Roy v. Volkswaqenwerk Aktienqesellschaft, 781 F.2d 670, 670-71 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (a timely, but unparticularized motion for a new trial 
is adequate to preserve the jurisdiction of the trial court to (1) 
allow the movant to file a subsequent memorandum detailing the 
grounds for relief and (2) rule on the motion) ; Martinez v. 
Trailior, 556 F.2d 818, 821 (7th Cir, 1977) (insufficiently 
particularized motions cannot preserve the court's jurisdiction); 
Registration Control Systems. 922 F.2d at 809 (Rule 7fs particular-
ity requirement is jurisdictional) . 
Consistent with the view that the Rules of Civil Procedure 
"must all be looked to in the light of their . . . fundamental 
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that 
the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute," 
Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91, it is the court's legal conclusion that the 
Rule 7 particularity requirement is not jurisdictional. Therefore, 
since Petitioner's motion was timely filed, his failure to state 
with particularity the grounds for relief does not prevent the 
court from exercising jurisdiction over the motion. The court's 
legal conclusion does not suggest that the particularity require-
ment need not be satisfied or that it may be satisfied in a manner 
that places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage. This 
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conclusion does imply, however, that the court may grant a movant 
who fails to state with particularity the grounds for relief time 
to supplement the motion with a memorandum setting forth the 
grounds for relief with particularity even if the memorandum is 
filed after the limitations period has expired. See Roy, 781 F.2d 
at 670-71 (if an initial motion is timely filed, but fails to state 
with particularity the grounds for relief, it is within the court's 
discretion to allow the movant to file a later document specifying 
the grounds for relief). Notwithstanding the liberalizing purpose 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, however, a movant should be 
allowed to file a subsequent memorandum only "in furtherance of 
justice and not as a reward for indifference or neglect, or where 
prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party or placing him at an 
unfair disadvantage." Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 57 P.2d 1132, 1136-
37 (Utah 1936) . Moreover, the greatest liberality should be 
exercised nearest the time when the initial motion is filed, but 
necessarily decreases over time as the likelihood of prejudice to 
the opposing party increases. See id. at 1137 ("[T]he liberality 
exercised in allowing amendments is greatest at the time the law 
suit is commenced and decreases as the suit progresses . . . . " ) . 
The memorandum in support of the motion to set aside was filed 
by Petitioner on August 12, 2003, sixteen months after the motion 
itself was filed. Ordinarily, when a motion is timely filed, but 
is lacking in particularity, the trial court will issue a schedul-
ing order setting reasonable due dates for the movant to file a 
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subsequent memorandum advancing the grounds for relief and for the 
opposing party to file a response to the motion. In the present 
case, this was apparently never done by the trial court judge nor 
did the parties request that the trial court issue such an order. 
Obviously, without the supporting memorandum, the motion to set 
aside is fatally deficient and Petitioner cannot prevail. The 
question then, is whether allowing Petitioner's supporting 
memorandum to be considered in ruling on his Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment would exceed the reasonable bounds of liberality that 
should be exercised by the court under the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
On the one hand, the filing of the memorandum was more than 
simply tardy. Its filing, a full sixteen months after the initial 
motion to set aside was filed, suggests that the failure to timely 
file the memorandum was the result of indifference. Moreover, at 
this point Respondent's interest in the finality of Judge Uno's 
order is significant. On the other hand, although the initial 
motion put Respondent on notice that the finality of the order was 
being challenged, Petitioner's failure for such an extended period 
of time to cure the insufficiency of the motion by setting forth 
the grounds for relief, suggests that his interest in having his 
case resolved on the merits is relatively weak. Finally, in light 
of the fact that it was Mr. Brass who represented Petitioner at the 
time the motion to set aside was filed, had the promised supporting 
memorandum been filed within a reasonable time, the deficiency of 
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Mr. Brass's representation would not have been included. As 
Respondent aptly argues, the deficiency of Mr. Brass's representa-
tion underlies each of the grounds for relief asserted by Peti-
tioner in his memorandum. To this extent Respondent would be 
prejudiced by permitting Petitioner's supporting memorandum to be 
considered in ruling on the motion to set aside, because it asserts 
grounds for relief which arguably would not have been asserted had 
it been timely filed. 
On the other hand, Respondent also did not pursue a resolution 
of the motion in a timely manner. Rather than promptly raising an 
objection to the lack of particularity of Petitioner's motion or 
objecting that the promised subsequent memorandum was not forthcom-
ing, Respondent did nothing for nine months. It was not until 
January 10, 2003, that Respondent finally filed a motion for 
permission to file a late response to Petitioner's motion. Twenty 
days later a notice to submit was filed and the motion was taken 
under advisement with a review date scheduled for March 31, 2003. 
However, on March 7, 2003, a hearing was held during which Judge 
Lewis disqualified herself from hearing the case. The case was 
then assigned to Judge Pat B. Brian on March 27, 2003. The docket 
does not indicate that Respondent again raised his motion to file 
a late response and the issue was never expressly resolved. 
Finally, on August 12, 2003, Petitioner, with new counsel, filed a 
memorandum in support of the motion to set aside setting forth with 
particularity the grounds for relief. This court then scheduled 
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due dates for Respondent's response and Petitioner's reply. 
The above-stated facts suggest that, in addition to the 
apparent indifference of Petitioner in filing a supporting 
memorandum, Respondent was also indifferent in pursuing a resolu-
tion of the motion to set aside. Moreover, despite the lengthy 
delays, Respondent was ultimately provided a fair opportunity to 
address the grounds for relief raised in Petitioner's supporting 
memorandum. In light of these facts, the court finds that the 
interests of Petitioner in having his motion to set aside decided 
on the merits outweighs the interests of Respondent regarding 
finality. The court therefore concludes that, in the interests of 
justice, Petitioner's Memorandum Supporting Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment will be considered in ruling on Petitioner's motion to set 
aside. 
B. Grounds for Relief Under Rule 60(b) 
1. Subsection (b)(1) 
Petitioner first contends that he is entitled to relief under 
Rule 60(b) (1), which allows for an order to be set aside if the 
movant can demonstrate that it was the result of "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b) (1). His argument is that subsection (b) (1) applies because 
he relied upon Mr. Brass to assert his interests, but instead Mr. 
Brass failed to perform his duties as an effective advocate. 
As previously noted, Mr. Brass was ineffective in his 
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representation of Petitioner.3 No evidence has been presented to 
the court, however, indicating that these failings were the result 
of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The reasons 
advanced by Petitioner for Mr. Brass's repeated failures are: (1) 
that Mr. Brass had no training in and lacked understanding of the 
complex legal and procedural rules governing capital post-convic-
tion litigation and (2) that Mr. Brass believed defaulting claims 
in State court would have no collateral consequences when Peti-
tioner sought relief in federal court. These explanations do not 
justify relief under subsection (b)(1), however. 
Mr. Brass's ineffective representation did not result from 
errors in applying esoteric legal standards, but were inexplicable 
failures to follow rudimentary procedural requirements and comply 
with court-ordered deadlines. See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392. In 
addition, although relief under subsection (b) (1) is possible where 
inaction occurs based upon a reasonable, good faith interpretation 
of the law that turns out to be erroneous, see Lund, 2000 UT 75 at 
3Mr. Brass's ineffective representation is evidenced by (1) failing twice 
to file an amended petition for post-conviction relief; (2) failing to respond 
to Respondent's motion to compel Petitioner's deposition; (3) failing to attend 
the deposition on November 5, 1999; (4) failing to respond to Respondent's second 
motion to compel Petitioner's deposition; (5) failing to answer Respondent's 
second set of interrogatories; (6) failing to respond to Respondent's motion to 
compel discovery responses; (7) failing to comply with the trial court's order 
to immediately provide discovery responses; (8) failing to respond to Respon-
dent's motion for sanctions; (9) failing to respond to Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment; (10) failing to obtain the $2,000 set aside by Judge Uno for 
the investigation of Petitioner's case; (11) failing to provide Petitioner with 
copies of legal materials; (12) failing to keep Petitioner fully informed of the 
procedural posture of the case; (13) failing to comply with Rule 7 and Rule 4-501 
in filing the motion to set aside; and (14) failing for over a year to file a 
memorandum in support of the motion to set aside. 
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failing to respond to motions, see Citicorp Mortgage/ Inc. v. 
Bartolome, 16 P.3d 827, 842 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000), the ineffective 
assistance of counsel of Mr. Brass exceeds any neglectful conduct 
that could be deemed "excusable." His inaction appears to have 
been willful and deliberate rather than the result of ignorance or 
carelessness. Such negligent conduct is not "excusable" within the 
meaning of subsection (b) (1) . See Boughner v. Secretary of Health/ 
Education and Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 978-79 (3d Cir. 1978) (in 
context of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion the court held that "[t]he 
conduct of [counsel] indicates neglect so gross that it is 
inexcusable."); Universal Film Exchanges/ Inc. v. Lust/ 479 F.2d 
573, 576 (4th Cir. 1973) (attorney's actions were "^grossly 
negligent' and cannot be deemed excusable neglect under Rule 
60(b) (1) .") ; Carcello v. TJX Companies, Inc./ 192 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D. 
Conn. 2000) ("Gross negligence on the part of counsel does not fall 
within the scope of excusable neglect as defined by Rule 
60(b)(1)."). In light of this finding, it is the court's conclu-
sion that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
Petitioner argues on equitable grounds that relief must be 
granted under subsection (b) (1) in order to avoid "punishing" 
Petitioner for Mr. Brass's conduct. Petitioner argues that because 
Mr. Brass's failures cannot be attributed to Petitioner, he cannot 
be held responsible for Mr. Brass's inexcusable conduct in the 
case. Respondent's rejoinder is that this argument necessarily 
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316, Petitioner cannot argue that Mr. Brass's inaction was the 
result of a reasonable, good faith interpretation of the law. Mr. 
Brass apparently believed that his inaction would not affect the 
review of Petitioner's claims either in a subsequent post-convic-
tion proceeding or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. There is 
no legal precedent for the view that defaulting claims in state 
court will have no collateral consequences in federal court or in 
subsequent post-conviction actions. Indeed, it is black letter law 
that, barring unusual circumstances, failing to preserve an issue 
will foreclose consideration of that issue in future proceedings of 
whatever kind. 
Furthermore, there has been no showing of due diligence that 
would indicate that Mr. Brass's failures were the result of 
excusable neglect. See Mini Spas, 733 P.2d at 132; BLack' s Title, 
Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330, 310, 991 P.2d 607. 
Nor do the facts show, as pointed out by Respondent, that these 
failures resulted from any circumstances beyond Mr. Brass's 
control, a lack of notice about deadlines, or legal or factual 
misunderstandings about whether or when he was required to respond. 
In fact, Mr. Brass candidly admitted at the evidentiary hearing 
that there was no legal basis to object to Respondent's motion for 
discovery, motion for sanctions, or the motion for summary 
judgment. 
Although subsection (b)(1) may properly apply in cases where 
there is an instance or two of failing to answer interrogatories or 
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fails as a matter of law because Utah appellate courts have clearly 
held that, in the context of Rule 60(b)(1), "any neglect by [a 
client's] attorney is attributable to [the client] through 
principles of agency." Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 
(Utah 1984). See also Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (under Rule 60(b)(1), ". . . neglect on the 
attorney's part is imputed to [the client] through principles of 
agency."). This is so because a client 
voluntarily [chooses his] attorney as his representative 
in the action, and he cannot . . . avoid the consequences 
of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. 
Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our 
system of representative litigation, in which each party 
is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is 
considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which 
can be charged upon the attorney." 
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 397 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 
626, 633-34 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Aver, 101 U.S. 320, 326 
(1880)). According to Respondent, because Petitioner is bound by 
the acts of his attorney through principles of agency, he cannot 
avoid the consequences of Mr. Brass's ineffective representation. 
Petitioner argues that unlike other civil litigants who 
voluntarily choose their attorney, he is an indigent inmate under 
a sentence of death and he neither chose nor hired Mr. Brass as his 
attorney. Rather, Mr. Brass was appointed by the court to provide 
him with representation. Therefore, the underlying rationale for 
holding a client responsible for the conduct of his attorney does 
not apply in his case, and he should not be held accountable for 
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the conduct of Mr. Brass which amounted to ineffective representa-
tion. See Franklin v. Lopez, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6550, *5 (N.D. 
111. 1999) ("[Petitioner] may have an argument that this [agency] 
rule should not apply in the case of misconduct by a court-
appointed attorney. In such cases the client has not chosen the 
attorney, negating a primary rationale for holding parties strictly 
liable for their attorney's mistakes."). 
There is merit to Petitioner's argument. In most civil 
litigation, each litigant is entitled to hire an attorney of his 
choice and may retain different counsel whenever a concern arises 
with respect to the adequacy of the representation. This is not 
true where the post-conviction litigation involves an indigent 
inmate under a sentence of death. In such cases, the litigant is 
statutorily entitled to the appointment of counsel pursuant to 
Section 78-35a-202 (2) (a) and he is not necessarily entitled to make 
a voluntary choice with respect to the attorney who will represent 
him. The appointment of counsel is left to the sound judgment of 
the trial court judge. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (2) (a) ("If 
the court finds the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly 
appoint counsel . . . . " ) . This circumstance argues in favor of 
not holding Petitioner responsible for the inadequate representa-
tion of Mr. Brass. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held, 
at least in the context of proceedings that are equitable in 
nature, that to "hold [a client] accountable for her lawyer's 
negligence, where she is statutorily entitled to appointed counsel/ 
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impermissibly undermines her r ight to counsel . ' ' T.S. v. State, 
2003 UT 54, 511/ 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (emphasis added). Based 
upon t h i s language in T.S. , 4 because Pe t i t i one r was s t a t u t o r i l y 
e n t i t l e d to appointed counsel in pursuing h is post-convict ion 
chal lenges, i t would be impermissible to hold P e t i t i o n e r account-
able for Mr. Brass ' s inadequate represen ta t ion . 
Although Pe t i t i one r cannot be held accountable for Mr. Brass 's 
f a i lu res does not mean tha t he i s automatical ly e n t i t l e d to the 
r e l i e f he seeks. The Utah Supreme Court has held tha t "[bjecause 
an appl ica t ion to set aside a default i s equi tab le in nature and i s 
addressed to the conscience of the court , a l l the attendant 
circumstances should be considered." Olsen, 565 P.2d at 1124 
(emphasis added). Consistent with t h i s view of equi tab le proceed-
ings, the Court in T.S. held tha t determining whether a l i t i g a n t ' s 
request for equi table r e l i e f should be granted does not end with an 
examination of the a t t o r n e y ' s inadequate r ep re sen t a t i on . Rather, 
a l i t i g a n t ' s own negligent or in t en t iona l ac ts might render r e l i e f 
inequi table even though he has made a showing tha t h is a t to rney ' s 
conduct has been grossly negl igent . See id . at SI 12 ("An examina-
t ion of the lawyer 's conduct does not end the t r i a l cour t ' s 
evaluation of the p a r t y ' s appl ica t ion for . . . r e l i e f . Although 
4Although the T.S. case involved the Utah Supreme Court cons ider ing the 
s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o appointed counsel in the con tex t of a t e r m i n a t i o n of pa ren t a l 
r i g h t s case , see Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-913 (1) (a) , t he gene ra l n a t u r e of the c i t ed 
language used by the Court s t r o n g l y sugges ts t h a t t he C o u r t ' s p o s i t i o n would 
apply with equal force to any s i t u a t i o n where a person i s s t a t u t o r i l y e n t i t l e d 
to appointed counse l . 
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a party is not responsible for his lawyer's conduct, a party's own 
negligent or intentional acts might render . . . relief inequita-
ble, notwithstanding a showing of ineffective assistance of 
counsel."). The fact that Petitioner's acts may be considered in 
determining whether relief should be granted implies that Peti-
tioner himself bears the responsibility of acting reasonably with 
respect to his case and that, while he cannot be held accountable 
for Mr. Brass's conduct, he may be held accountable for his own 
negligent or intentional conduct. 
Petitioner authorized the filing of the petition for post-
conviction relief. Therefore, he necessarily bears some personal 
responsibility for prosecuting his case and keeping abreast of its 
status and progress. Moreover, this principle of accountability is 
consistent with Utah appellate court decisions holding that under 
subsection 60(b)(1), "xthe movant must show that he has used due 
diligence . . . .'" Black's Title, 1999 UT App 330 at 110 (quoting 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)). 
See Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor 
de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1278 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[B]ecause of its 
lack of diligence in following the course of this case, [the 
client] is precluded from demanding Rule 60(b) relief due to the 
negligence of its attorney.") . See also Pryor v. U.S. Postal 
Service, 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985) ("This court has 
pointedly announced that a party has a duty of diligence to inquire 
about the status of a case, and that Rule 60(b) relief will be 
42 
H A ' 
afforded only in ^unique circumstances.' ") ; Couch v. Private 
Diagnostic Clinic, 515 S.E.2d 30, 38 n.3 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) 
(" [A] ttorney neglect can also constitute grounds for relief under 
Rule 60(b) (1), if the client has been diligent in communicating 
with his attorney and is not otherwise at fault."); Lynch v. 
Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc., 491 A.2d 515, 519 (D.C. 1985) 
("'Counsel's conduct will not be imputed to the client, and thus 
relief will be available under Rule 60(b) (1), when that conduct "is 
outrageously in violation of . . . his implicit duty to devote 
reasonable efforts in representing his client,' provided that the 
client himself is diligent in pursuing the claim." (quoting Railway 
Express Agency, Inc. v. Hill, 250 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C. 1969)).5 
Thus, if Petitioner was appropriately diligent and conscientious in 
5This view is also consistent with appellate decisions addressing relief 
under subsection (b) (6) which have held that in cases where there is an 
allegation that counsel has been grossly negligent, a client can only avoid 
responsibility if he demonstrates that he has been diligent in monitoring his 
case. Inrvco v. Metropolitan Engineering Co., 708 F.2d 1225, 1234 (7th Cir. 
1983) P[A]llowing relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires a diligent, conscientious 
client."); Dominguez v. United States, 583 F.2d 615, 618 (2nd Cir. 1978) (even 
where the attorney has inexcusably and completely abandoned his responsibilities, 
the client must still demonstrate his own diligent efforts to induce his attorney 
to fulfill his duty); L. P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. 
Cir. 1964) (Rule 60(b) (6) "is broad enough to permit relief when as in this case 
personal problems of counsel cause him grossly to neglect a diligent client's 
case and mislead the client." (emphasis added)); Cobos v. Adelphi University, 179 
F.R.D. 381, 388 (E.D.N.Y 1998) ("[A]n attorney's gross negligence is not a basis 
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) unless the gross negligence is explained by 
exceptional circumstances and the movant makes a showing of client diligence in 
the face of the attorney's negligence."); Binderman v. Schapiro, 1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1171, *6 (N.D. 111.1992) ("Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is . . . unwarranted 
because plaintiff was not diligent and was sophisticated enough to know that he 
should have been diligent in supervising his case and attorney.") ; In re Muzguiz, 
122 B.R. 56, 59 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990) ("[C]ourts that have considered an 
attorney's gross negligence as grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) have held 
that it is the client's responsibility to be diligent in keeping up with their 
lawsuit.") (citing Inryco, Inc. v. Metropolitan Engineering Co., 708 F.2d 1225 
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cirami, 535 F.2d 736 (2nd Cir. 1976)). 
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fulfilling his responsibility of monitoring the status and progress 
of his case, he may be entitled to the relief he seeks. If not, he 
is accountable for his own negligent or intentional conduct. 
Petitioner is an impecunious inmate housed at the Utah State 
prison under a sentence of death. Therefore, his ability to 
monitor the status of his case might be restricted. Unlike other 
civil litigants, he cannot easily meet with or speak to his 
attorney, nor does he have ready access to the court docket as a 
means of independently verifying the progress of his case or 
keeping informed concerning what documents have been filed and what 
hearings have been scheduled. Although the level of diligence 
which Petitioner might display will therefore be relatively low, he 
must still exercise that level of diligence that a reasonably 
prudent person in his circumstances would exercise. See also Mini 
Spas, 733 P.2d at 132. 
Petitioner's second affidavit indicates that he "expressly 
told Brass [he] was innocent, expressed [his] concerns to Brass 
about extending time limits for the case, and expressed [his] 
concerns to Brass that he should not take more time than needed for 
the investigation of [the] case, as delay might be fatal." 
Affidavit of Ralph Leroy Menzies, September 17, 2003. This 
language clearly suggests that Petitioner was personally aware that 
any delay in his case could have severe consequences regarding the 
outcome of his petition for post-conviction relief. However, 
Petitioner indicates that he was unaware that his case was not 
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proceeding expeditiously. According to Petitioner, it was not 
until August 12, 2003, that he learned that Mr. Brass had defaulted 
on numerous motions during discovery, "that discovery sanctions 
barring [Petitioner] from presenting further evidence were imposed 
against [him] as a result of Brass's failure to comply with 
discovery, [and] that a default summary judgment order which Brass 
did not oppose [had] been granted against [him] in the trial 
court."6 Affidavit of Ralph Leroy Menzies, August 12, 2003. 
Petitioner also has stated that Mr. Brass told him that the "case 
was under control and to trust him to take care of it."7 Affidavit 
of Ralph Leroy Menzies, September 17, 2003. 
Assuming Petitioner was told by Mr. Brass that the case was 
under control and that Petitioner only recently had been informed 
of Mr. Brass's inadequate representation and that court orders had 
been entered against him, Petitioner was nonetheless independently 
aware that his case was not proceeding in a timely fashion and that 
there were serious problems with Mr. Brass's representation. 
Petitioner's original petition for post-conviction relief was filed 
in April 1995, and three years later, in March 1998, Mr. Brass was 
6However, at the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner indicated that he learned 
about the default summary judgment order on January 2, 2003. 
7It is unclear exactly what this quoted phrase means because no real 
context has been provided. It could mean that Mr. Brass told Petitioner once, 
at the beginning of his representation, that the case was under control; or it 
could mean that Mr. Brass said this while the case was, in fact, under control, 
but not after Mr. Brass's representation began to falter; or, it could mean that 
Mr. Brass indicated to Petitioner throughout his representation that the case was 
under control even when it clearly was not. 
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appointed to represent Petitioner. Another four years passed 
before Judge Uno issued his order granting Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment. Thus seven years of post-conviction litigation, 
fourteen years after Petitioner's conviction and sixteen years 
after the murder was committed, have lapsed. 
Petitioner's own statements show the he was aware of circum-
stances that called into question the quality of Mr. Brass's 
representation and the progress of his case. Petitioner asserts 
that after Mr. Brass was appointed, he stopped receiving copies of 
legal documents. See Affidavit of Ralph Leroy Menzies, August 12, 
2003. For the duration of Mr. Brass's representation, Petitioner 
was, for the most part, unable to contact his attorney by telephone 
either because no one in Mr. Brass's office answered, his staff 
refused to accept the collect call, or they simply hung up.8 See 
Affidavit of Ralph Leroy Menzies, September 17, 2003. In addition, 
many of Petitioner's journal entries and letters indicate he was 
aware that there were problems with his case and with Mr. Brass's 
representation. In a June 16, 1998 letter to Mr. Brass, Petitioner 
states that "I've been expecting to hear from you & haven't, so I'm 
wondering what's up? I'm not trying to rush you & in fact I guess 
you should take what-ever time you feel necessary, I'm just curious 
8Telephone records from the Department of Corrections and Petitioner's own 
journal indicate that during Mr. Brass's four years of representation, Petitioner 
made literally hundreds of phone calls in an attempt to contact Mr. Brass. In 
only a handful of these calls was Petitioner actually able to speak with Mr. 
Brass or a member of his legal staff. 
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as to how things stand.'7 On November 29, 1998, Petitioner comments 
in his journal that he wrote Mr. Brass a letter about not opposing 
the State's motion to dismiss and whether that would have an affect 
on the post-conviction litigation. In a March 4, 1999 letter, and 
in a journal entry on the same date, Petitioner complains that he 
is worried "about getting our investigation done . . .," and 
expresses frustration that Mr. Brass has not "gotten the investiga-
tor on my case yet or any other experts, i.e.: mitigation experts, 
mental health experts, etc." In letters to Mr. Brass dated 
September 24, 1998, September 9, 1999, and January 2, 2003, 
Petitioner complains about his inability to contact Mr. Brass and 
expresses frustration with the progress of his case. Moreover, 
attorneys Richard Uday, Lynn Donaldson, and Amy Brass all testified 
at the evidentiary hearing that Petitioner repeatedly complained to 
them about the lack of communication with Mr. Brass, Mr. Brass's 
ineffective representation, and the lack of progress of his case. 
At a hearing before Judge Uno held during July 1998, Peti-
tioner expressed concern that Lynn Donaldson, rather than Mr. 
Brass, was in court representing Petitioner's interests. At the 
November 5, 1998 deposition, Petitioner was well aware that Mr. 
Brass failed to appear and that he had sent Julie George in his 
stead. Also, Petitioner only learned the day of his deposition 
that attorneys for Respondent would be coming to the prison to 
depose him. In addition, the docket and Petitioner's journal 
entries suggest that no court hearings were convened in Peti-
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tioner's case from the beginning of 1999 through 2002, something he 
must have been aware of. Finally, Petitioner's journal indicates 
that he had no contact with Mr. Brass for nearly an entire year, 
from January 23, 2002 to January 13, 2003. 
Petitioner's ability to monitor the status and progress of his 
case was somewhat limited. However, these problems were clearly 
known to Petitioner9 and he was repeatedly, over a prolonged period 
of time, independently put on notice that his case was languishing 
and that there were serious problems with Mr. Brass's representa-
tion. Petitioner's awareness of these problems is buttressed by 
the fact that he was not a typical inmate: On October 29, 1991, 
Petitioner received a Certificate of Completion for a basic 
paralegal skills course. In light of Petitioner's cognizance that 
any delay in his case "might be fatal, " and particularly in view of 
the fact that he was proclaiming his innocence, a reasonably 
prudent person in Petitioner's circumstances would have, at a 
minimum, contacted the court about his concerns either by mail or 
at any one of the several court hearings at which he was present. 
Petitioner did not contact the court during the four years of Mr. 
9In a journal entry dated December 22, 1998, Petitioner states that he 
received copies of the State's motion to dismiss and the motion to compel his 
deposition. In a March 4, 1999 entry, it is clear that Petitioner is aware that 
an amended petition for post-conviction relief has not yet been filed. Richard 
Uday testified at the evidentiary hearing that he occasionally provided 
Petitioner with copies of the case docket, including a copy of the docket dated 
in August 9, 1999. In a January 23, 2002 journal entry, Petitioner indicates 
that Mr. Brass told him that the trial court had granted the State's motion for 
summary judgment, but that he should not worry because there was a discovery stay 
in place. 
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Brass's representation prior to the summary judgment being granted 
even though Petitioner was fully aware that contacting the court 
was achievable. Petitioner had previously contacted by telephone 
a clerk at the Utah Supreme Court, a Third District Court clerk, 
Judge Lewis's court clerk in January 1995, and Third District Court 
clerk Barbara Bond on June 30, 1997. In addition, Petitioner wrote 
at least one letter to the Utah State Bar and one or two letters to 
district court judges over several years. On at least one occasion 
prior to Mr. Brass's appointment, Petitioner contacted the trial 
court regarding his difficulties communicating with prior counsel 
in his case. At a hearing on January 29, 1997, the trial court 
gave Petitioner's correspondence to counsel and requested counsel 
and the attorneys for Respondent to work together to facilitate 
communication between Petitioner and his counsel at the Utah State 
Prison. See Tr., vol. IV at 1044. Ultimately, prior counsel was 
removed from his case at Petitioner's request. In July 2003, 
Petitioner requested the court to remove Mr. Brass as counsel and 
Elizabeth Hunt was appointed in September 2003. 
This evidence strongly supports the conclusion that Petitioner 
had the knowledge and the ability to inform the court of problems 
he was encountering with his case. However, despite his concerns 
with Mr. Brass's representation and the lack of progress in his 
case, Petitioner intentionally acquiesced in the delay of his case 
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by keeping Mr. Brass as his attorney.10 A reasonably prudent person 
in his circumstances would have dismissed Mr. Brass as counsel of 
record. The court concludes that Petitioner's actions were 
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. 
Based upon the court's finding that the negligent conduct of 
Mr. Brass was not excusable, Petitioner is not entitled to relief 
under subsection (b)(1). Also, Petitioner's secondary argument 
that he should not be "punished" for Mr. Brass's grossly negligent 
conduct, is not persuasive under subsection (b) (1) . Petitioner 
cannot be held responsible for the ineffective representation of 
Mr. Brass. However, in order to obtain relief under subsection 
(b)(1), Petitioner must demonstrate that he acted as a reasonably 
prudent person would have acted under similar circumstances. Given 
the fact that Petitioner was repeatedly on notice that there were 
problems with Mr. Brass's representation and that his case was not 
proceeding expeditiously, and in light of the fact that he knew any 
10A March 5, 2003 journal entry is indicative of Petitioner's intention in 
this regard: 
Saw Ed Brass. (Yea! Surprise, surprise!) Ed came out to tell me 
that he has put a motion in to Judge Lewis to set aside the part of 
my habeas that Judge Uno screwed me on just before he left (re-
tired) . He said that Judge Lewis was prepared to rule in my behalf 
but that because she was such good friends with Ed and Amy (she even 
married them) , that it might be a conflict of interest for both him 
to represent me & her to be my judge. He told me I had to choose 
between him & Judge Lewis. I told Ed it was a no brainer. He was 
my attorney & I didn't want a new attorney under any circumstances 
and while I like Lewis, I would rather she left than him. 
Even with the prospect that a judge would rule in his favor on the motion to set 
aside if he gave up Mr. Brass as his attorney, and in the context of his repeated 
complaints about the progress of his case and his expression of frustration with 
Mr. Brass's representation, Petitioner still indicated that he "didn't want a new 
attorney under any circumstances." 
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delays could have serious consequences, any reasonably prudent 
person in Petitioner's circumstances, particularly one professing 
innocence, would have immediately and repeatedly contacted the 
trial court regarding Mr. Brass's representation and the lack of 
progress of his case. By intentionally choosing to keep Mr. Brass 
as counsel of record, Petitioner failed to act as a reasonably 
prudent person in his circumstances would have acted. The court 
finds that Petitioner's actions and choices in keeping Mr. Brass as 
his attorney were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. 
Therefore, it would be inequitable to grant Petitioner relief under 
subsection (b)(1). 
2. Subsection (b)(4) 
Petitioner next contends that he is entitled to relief* under 
Rule 60(b)(4) because the judgment is void. He argues that Mr. 
Brass's ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a violation 
of Petitioner's right to due process of law. Because a judgment is 
void "if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due 
process," Richins, 817 P.2d at 385, Petitioner argues that Judge 
Uno's order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment must 
be declared void and should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b) (4) . 
Respondent asserts that Petitioner is essentially arguing that the 
order is void as a result of a due process violation because Mr. 
Brass's representation was ineffective within the meaning of the 
Sixth Amendment. However, since "[t]here is no constitutional 
right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, . . . a 
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petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel in such proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
752 (1991). As a result, Mr. Brass's inadequate representation 
cannot rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance 
of counsel in violation of Petitioner's right to due process. 
Therefore, Respondent argues, it would be inappropriate for the 
court to conclude that Judge Uno's order is void.11 
Despite the parties' focus on the ineffective assistance of 
counsel by Mr. Brass and whether his representation constituted a 
violation of Petitioner's due process rights, cases addressing 
relief under Rule 60(b)(4) indicate that a judgment "is void only 
if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due 
process." Richins, 817 P.2d at 385 (emphasis added). See also 
Garcia, 712 P.2d at 291 n.5 (same). The language of Richins and 
Garcia clearly indicates that it must be the actions of the trial 
court, not counsel, that are inconsistent with due process in order 
for the judgment to be void for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4). This 
conclusion is consistent with the general meaning of a "void" 
judgment, namely, that in order "for a judgment to be void under 
l:LAlthough Petitioner may not be constitutionally entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel, he has argued elsewhere that because he is statutorily 
entitled to appointed counsel, the representation he receives must be effective. 
See State ex rel. E.H. v. A.H., 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). See also 
T.S. v. State, 2003 UT 54, f7-fll, 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 16. Because the court 
believes that both parties have erroneously focused upon the inadequate 
representation of Mr. Brass under subsection (b)(4), it is unnecessary for the 
court to resolve whether Petitioner's statutory right to appointed counsel in a 
capital post-conviction case means that appointed counsel must thereby render 
effective assistance. 
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Rule 60(b) (4), it must be determined that the rendering court was 
powerless to enter it." V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 
224 (10th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added) . See also Ben Sager 
Chemicals International, Inc. v. E. Tarqozs & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 
812 (7th Cir. 1977) ("A void judgment has been narrowly defined . 
. to exist only where a court usurps power by rendering a 
judgment over matters beyond the scope of authority granted to it 
by its creators."). The fact that Petitioner's counsel may have 
been ineffective does not warrant the conclusion that Judge Uno was 
powerless to render a decision on Respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. 
In the context of a motion to set aside a civil judgment, 
"'all that due process requires . . . is proper notice and service 
of process[/] . . . [by] a court of competent jurisdiction,'" New 
York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d 1015, 1027 (5th Cir. 
1982)), and the opportunity to be heard. See Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("The fundamen-
tal requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be 
heard."). See also Ex parte Third Generation, 855 So.2d 489, 492 
(Ala. 2003) ("[T]he term 'due process," in the context of providing 
a foundation for declaring a judgment void, refers to procedural, 
rather than substantive, due process: xIt is established by the 
decisions in this and in Federal jurisdictions that due process of 
law means notice, a hearing according to that notice, and a 
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judgment entered in accordance with such notice and hearing.'" 
(quoting Frahn v. Grevling Realization Corp., 195 So. 758, 761 
(Ala. 1940))); Worrall v. Qgden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 602 
(Utah 1980) ("The bare essentials of due process have been 
characterized as (1) notice of the proposed action, and (2) an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter."); Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. 
v. Public Service Commission, 96 P.2d 722, 725 (Utah 1939) ("The 
essential elements of due process of law are notice, and an 
opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding 
adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having 
jurisdiction of the cause." (emphasis in original)). 
Petitioner also asserts two errors by Judge Uno: (1) that no 
inquiry or assessment was made of Mr. Brass's qualifications under 
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and (2) that Mr. 
Brass was not removed from Petitioner's case despite the "obvious 
and glaring instances of substandard performance." Petitioner's 
Mem. in Supp. at 25. Petitioner provides no argument, however, 
that either of these alleged failures demonstrate that Judge Uno 
"acted in a manner inconsistent with due process" or that he was 
otherwise powerless to issue a ruling on Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment. Although an evidentiary hearing was never 
convened that would have allowed Petitioner to present evidence in 
his favor, this fact does not warrant the conclusion that Judge Uno 
acted in a manner that prevented Petitioner from having an 
opportunity to be heard. As noted by Petitioner himself, "Judge 
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Uno . . , repeatedly expressed a willingness to consider all of 
[Petitioner's] claims . . . ." Petitioner's Mem. in Supp. at 25. 
Moreover, "[d]ue process does not . . . require that the defendant 
in every civil case actually have a hearing on the merits. A 
[court] can, for example, enter a default judgment against a 
defendant who, . . . without justifiable excuse, violates a 
procedural rule requiring the production of evidence necessary for 
orderly adjudication." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 
(1971). This is essentially what occurred in the present case 
after Judge Uno granted Respondent's motion for sanctions. For 
these reasons, the court concludes that Petitioner cannot rely upon 
subsection (b)(4) for relief. 
3. Subsection (b) (5) 
Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to relief under 
Rule 60(b)(5) because "it is no longer equitable that [the order 
granting summary judgment] should have prospective application." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (5) . Petitioner argues that Judge Uno's order 
is prospective in nature and that circumstances of the case have 
changed, rendering enforcement of the order inequitable. However, 
there is no legal support for this position. Petitioner further 
argues that, while Judge Uno's order will likely "be the foundation 
of all of the State's future arguments in favor of expeditiously 
executing [Petitioner]," Petitioner's Mem. in Supp. at 26, a 
judgment has prospective application only if it requires a party to 
perform or not perform a future act or the court to continually 
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supervise the parties as a result of changing conditions. See 
Twelve John Does, 841 F.2d at 1138. There are no such requirements 
that arise from Judge Uno's order granting the motion for summary 
judgment. The order will have continuing consequences for 
Petitioner, but this does not mean that it has "prospective 
application" for purposes of subsection (b) (5) . See id. 
Even if the order granting summary judgment has prospective 
application, Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances that 
existed at the time the order was entered have changed and, 
therefore, that enforcement of the order would be inequitable. 
Petitioner contends that the recent filing of several affidavits 
counts as "subsequent events . . . which demonstrate that it would 
be inequitable for the summary judgment order to have prospective 
application . . . ." Petitioner's Mem. in Supp. at 26. However, 
Petitioner's affidavits simply explain the circumstances as they 
existed at the time Judge Uno entered the order and neither the 
filing of the affidavits nor the affidavits themselves demonstrate 
that these circumstances have been altered. "Obviously, if neither 
the law supporting [the] original [order] . . . nor the facts have 
changed, there would be no need to decide the propriety of a Rule 
60(b)(5) motion." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216 (1997). 
For these reasons, the court concludes that Petitioner cannot 
prevail on subsection (b)(5) for relief. 
4. Subsection (b) (6) 
Finally, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief under 
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subsection (b) (6), which allows for judgments to be set aside for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). According to Petitioner, 
"any other reason justifying relief" includes situations where 
counsel has performed incompetently or where, as a result of 
counsel's performance, there has been a violation of due process. 
In support of his claim that these reasons apply to his own case, 
Petitioner again points to the inadequate and negligent represen-
tation of Mr. Brass. Reliance upon Mr. Brass's negligent conduct 
renders application of subsection (b)(6) problematic. Utah 
appellate courts have held that "subsection ([6]) may not be 
employed for relief when the grounds asserted are encompassed 
within subsection (1)." Lincoln Benefit, 838 P.2d at 674. See 
also Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863 ("Rule 60(b) (6) . . . grants . . . 
courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment . 
. . provided that the motion is macJe within a reasonable time and 
is not premised on one of the grounds for relief enumerated in 
clauses (b) (1) through (b) (5) .") . Petitioner has already relied 
upon the negligent conduct of Mr. Brass as a claim for relief under 
subsection (b) (1). The court denied Petitioner relief under 
subsection (b)(1) on the ground that Mr. Brass's conduct was not 
excusable. It follows that this same inexcusably negligent conduct 
alone cannot constitute "any other reason" for relief. Unless 
unusual or extraordinary circumstances are also present, subsection 
(b)(6) cannot be relied upon by Petitioner. 
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Nevertheless, Petitioner's argument implicitly suggests that 
subsection (b) (1) is reserved only for instances of "mere" 
negligence, while instances of "gross" negligence must be consid-
ered under subsection (b) (6). Specifically, Petitioner relies upon 
the case of Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164 (9th 
Cir. 2002), which concluded that, in the jurisdictions that have 
distinguished between negligence and gross negligence in the 
context of a motion to set aside, courts have uniformly held that 
"an unknowing client should not be held liable on the basis of a 
default judgment resulting from an attorney's grossly negligent 
conduct, and that in such cases sanctions should be imposed on the 
lawyer, rather than on the faultless client." Id. at 1169. 
According to the Tani court, "[w]hen an attorney is grossly 
negligent, . . . the judicial system loses credibility as well as 
the appearance of fairness, if the result is that an innocent party 
is forced to suffer drastic consequences." Id. at 1170. 
No Utah appellate court has directly addressed the issue 
whether gross attorney negligence should be separately considered 
under subsection (b) (6) . However, in the case of In re Interest of 
A.G., 2001 UT App 87, 27 P.3d 562, the Court of Appeals stated in 
a footnote that "Rule 60(b) (6) is 'sufficiently broad' to permit a 
court to set aside a judgment for ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Id. at 19 n.3. Petitioner argues that his statutory 
right to counsel, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202 (2) (a), entitles 
him to the effective assistance of counsel and, therefore, because 
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Mr. Brass provided grossly negligent r ep resen ta t ion , i . e . , 
i ne f fec t ive ass i s tance of counsel, he i s e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f under 
subsection (b) (6). In support of his argument t ha t he i s e n t i t l e d 
to the e f fec t ive ass i s tance of counsel, P e t i t i o n e r r e l i e s on the 
case of T.S. v. S ta te , 2003 UT 54. In T.S. , the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly agreed with the Utah Court of Appeals holding in the case 
of State ex r e l . E.H. v. A.H., 880 P.2d 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
that because a parent in a parenta l r i gh t s terminat ion proceeding 
i s s t a t u t o r i l y e n t i t l e d to counsel, tha t parent i s a l so e n t i t l e d to 
the e f fec t ive ass i s t ance of counsel. See T.S./ 2003 UT 54 at 57. 
The Court reasoned tha t even though the Code section1 2 e n t i t l i n g a 
parent to be represented by counsel "does not express ly s t a t e that 
counsel must be e f fec t ive , the s t a t u t e would be meaningless or 
i l l u so ry i f i t guaranteed only inef fec t ive a s s i s t ance of counsel. 
The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s omission of ^effect ive ' should not be read to 
suggest an i n t en t to provide only ine f fec t ive ass i s tance of 
counsel ." Id. (quoting Sta te ex r e l . E.H., 880 P.2d at 13). 
According to Pe t i t i one r , the same reasoning necessar i ly 
applies in the case of a cap i t a l pos t -convic t ion l i t i g a n t . That 
12The Code s e c t i o n e n t i t l i n g a pa ren t t o the appointment of counsel in a 
p a r e n t a l r i g h t s t e r m i n a t i o n proceeding i s found in Sec t ion 78-3a-913(1)(a) and 
reads as fo l lows : 
The p a r e n t s , guard ian , cus tod ian , and the minor, i f competent, s h a l l 
be informed t h a t they have the r i g h t to be r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel a t 
every s t a g e of the p roceed ings . They have the r i g h t t o employ 
counsel of t h e i r own choice and i f any of them r e q u e s t s an a t t o rney 
and i s found by the cou r t t o be i n d i g e n t , counsel s h a l l be appointed 
by the cou r t as provided in subsec t ion (3 ) . The cour t may appoint 
counsel wi thout a r e q u e s t i f i t cons ide r s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by counsel 
necessa ry to p r o t e c t t he i n t e r e s t of the minor or of o t h e r p a r t i e s . 
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is, the statute mandating a right to counsel in capital post-
conviction cases would be meaningless if it did not guarantee 
effective assistance of counsel. In order "to give effect . . . to 
every word of the statute," T.S. , 2003 UT 54 at SI8 (citations 
omitted), Petitioner argues that the court must conclude that he is 
statutorily entitled to effective representation. See also Lozada 
v. Warden, 613 A.2d 818, 821 (Conn. 1992) ("It would be absurd to 
have the right to appointed counsel who is not required to be 
competent. x[C]ounsel should be appointed in post conviction 
matters . . . . When counsel is so appointed he must be effective 
and competent. Otherwise, the appointment is a useless formal-
ity. '" (quoting Cullins v. Crouse, 348 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 
1965))); Commonwealth v. Albert, 561 A.2d 736, 738 (Penn. 1989) 
(where petitioner has a statutory right to appointed counsel, he 
has the concomitant right to the effective assistance of counsel) . 
Petitioner argues that because he is entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel, subsection (b)(6) is a basis for relief. 
Respondent counters that in enacting Section 78-35a-202, the 
Legislature did not intend to create a right to effective post-
conviction counsel commensurate with the right to effective counsel 
in criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment. To do so would 
render capital post-conviction proceedings interminable. "[I]f 
counsel for post-conviction proceedings, as well as trial and 
direct appeal, must meet the same standards, then claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the immediate prior proceed-
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ings may be raised ad infinitum." Beiarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 
922, 925 (Nev. 1996). Rather, the Legislature has required that 
appointed counsel meet minimum qualifications prescribed by Rule 8 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. According to Respondent, 
because Petitioner has the benefit of counsel that is qualified 
under Rule 8, Section 78-35a-202 should not be interpreted to 
require that appointed counsel be effective within the meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, Petitioner cannot rely upon 
subsection (b)(6). 
The court does not have to resolve this issue. Assuming that 
Petitioner's argument has merit and that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel from Mr. Brass, he has not demonstrated that 
he is entitled to relief. Under Rule 60(b) (6), which is a 
proceeding in equity, "[c]ourts allowing . . . relief uniformly 
require a diligent, conscientious client." Inrvco/ 708 F.2d at 
1234. Indeed, as noted above, according to the Tani court a 
litigant seeking relief under subsection (b) (6) based upon the 
gross negligence of his attorney must be "an unknowing client" or 
"an innocent party." Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169, 1170. See also 
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 393 ("To justify relief under subsection (6), 
a party must show ^extraordinary circumstances' suggesting that the 
party is faultless in the delay."); United States v. Moradi, 673 
F.2d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 1982) (in the context of Rule 60(b)(6), 
"justice also demands that a blameless party not be disadvantaged 
by the errors or neglect of his attorney which cause final, 
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involuntary termination of proceedings." (emphasis added)); In re 
Ireco Industries, Inc., 2 B.R. 76, 83 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1979) 
("[C]ourts have shown considerable sympathy for the plight of the 
diligent litigant with an incompetent or sloppy lawyer.7' (emphasis 
added)). 
As previously noted, "[b]ecause an application to set aside a 
default is equitable in nature and is addressed to the conscience 
of the court, all the attendant circumstances should be consid-
ered." Olsen, 565 P.2d at 1124 (emphasis added). Thus, M[a]n 
examination of the lawyer's conduct does not end the trial court's 
evaluation of the party's application for . . . [equitable] relief. 
Although a party is not responsible for his lawyer's conduct, a 
party's own negligent or intentional acts might render . . . relief 
inequitable, notwithstanding a showing of ineffective assistance of 
counsel." T.S. , 2003 UT 54 at 512. In light of this guidance, the 
court must carefully consider whether Petitioner himself acted as 
a reasonably prudent person would have acted in similar circum-
stances. As previously discussed, Petitioner was put on notice 
over a period of many months that there were numerous, ongoing 
problems with Mr. Brass's representation and that his case was not 
proceeding expeditiously. Confronted repeatedly with these facts, 
Petitioner knew any delays could have serious consequences. Thus, 
any reasonably prudent person in Petitioner's circumstances, 
particularly one professing to be innocent, would have, at a 
minimum, contacted the trial court about the ineffective assistance 
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of counsel by Mr. Brass and the lack of progress of his case. 
Petitioner had numerous opportunities and the ability to contact 
the court regarding his concerns. Petitioner repeatedly and 
deliberately elected to keep Mr. Brass as counsel. Therefore, 
Petitioner failed to act as a reasonably prudent person in his 
circumstances would have acted. Thus, consistent with the court's 
conclusions with respect to Petitioner's request for relief under 
subsection (b)(1), it would be inequitable to grant Petitioner 
relief under subsection (b) (6) . See Inrvco, 708 F.2d at 1234 ("The 
defendants here were not diligent in pursuing this case and 
therefore would not prevail even if gross negligence qualified as 
another Rule 60 (b) ground for relief . . . . Affidavits submitted 
by the defendants showed that they failed to follow the progress of 
the case and failed to regularly inquire of their lawyer or the 
court as to the case's current status."). 
C. Meritorious Claims 
In light of the court' s conclusions that Petitioner is not 
entitled to the relief he seeks under any of the Rule 60(b) 
subsections upon which he has relied, it is unnecessary for the 
court to determine whether Petitioner has any meritorious claims. 
See Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149 ("'Once timeliness and a basis for 
relief under Rule 60(b) . . . have been established, the sole issue 
is whether, as a matter of law, a defendant's proposed Answer 
contains a defense which is entitled to be tried.'" (quoting 
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Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1059 (Durham, J., dissenting))). Even if 
such claims exist for purposes of Rule 60(b), Petitioner would 
still not be entitled to have Judge Uno's order granting Respon-
dent's motion for summary judgment set aside. 
Conclusion 
Petitioner, Ralph Leroy Menzies, has requested this court, 
pursuant to Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
exercise its equitable powers and grant his motion to set aside 
Judge Uno's order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment 
and dismissing Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Generally, Petitioner argues that because his attorney, Ed Brass, 
provided ineffective representation, he is entitled to relief under 
subsections (1), (4), (5), and (6) of Rule 60(b). Respondent 
argues that because Petitioner's motion did not state with 
particularity the grounds for relief, his motion was untimely. 
Therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider 
Petitioner's motion. However, after a careful review of the 
applicable rules and statutes, as well as governing case law, it is 
the court's conclusion that although Petitioner's motion failed in 
several significant respects to comport with established procedural 
rules, the motion was nevertheless timely filed within the three 
month period mandated by Rule 60(b) when relief is sought under 
subsection (1). Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to consider 
Petitioner's motion. 
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With respect to Petitioner's claim for relief under subsection 
(b)(4), he has failed to demonstrate that Judge Uno's order is 
void. Under established law, in order for a judgment to be void, 
the movant must demonstrate that the rendering court was powerless 
to enter it. The fact that Petitioner's counsel provided ineffec-
tive representation does not warrant the conclusion that Judge Uno 
was powerless to render a decision on Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief 
under Rule 60(b) (4) . 
Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that he is entitled 
to relief under subsection (b) (5) . He argues that it is inequita-
ble that the order granting summary judgment has prospective 
application and, therefore, the order should be set aside. An 
order or judgment has prospective application if it requires a 
party to perform or not perform a future act or if it requires the 
court to continually supervise the parties as a result of changing 
conditions. These requirements are simply not a part of Judge 
Uno's order granting the motion for summary judgment. It is true 
that the order will have continuing consequences for Petitioner, 
but this does not mean that it has "prospective application" for 
purposes of subsection (b) (5) . Therefore, Petitioner is not 
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) (5). 
Under subsection (b)(1), Petitioner argues that he is entitled 
to relief on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect because he relied upon Mr. Brass to effectively 
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represent him, and Mr. Brass failed to do so. Although Mr. Brass's 
representation was ineffective, Petitioner has failed to demon-
strate that any of Mr. Brass's failings were the result of mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. On the contrary, Mr. 
Brass's negligent representation appears to have been wilful and 
deliberate and, therefore, clearly not excusable. Petitioner is 
not entitled to relief under subsection (b)(1). 
Petitioner also argues that relief must be granted under 
subsection (b) (1) in order to avoid "punishing" him for Mr. Brass's 
negligent conduct. Respondent contends that because post-convic-
tion proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in nature, 
governing case law mandates that Petitioner must bear the burden of 
his attorney's ineffective assistance. This court concludes that 
in light of recent case law, Petitioner cannot be held accountable 
for Mr. Brass's ineffective representation. Nevertheless, amotion 
to set aside a judgment is equitable in nature and is addressed to 
the conscience of the court. Therefore, all of Petitioner's 
conduct and choices must be considered by the court, including 
Petitioner's intentional acts and choices. Petitioner stated 
repeatedly that he was clearly aware that any delay in his case 
could be detrimental and have severe consequences regarding the 
outcome of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner 
contends that he only recently learned that his post-conviction 
case was not proceeding expeditiously. However, the evidence 
presented to the court clearly shows that he was personally and 
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repeatedly on notice for several years that there were problems 
with Mr. Brass's representation and that his case was languishing. 
Petitioner's original petition for post-conviction relief was 
filed in April 1995, and three years later, in March 1998, Mr. 
Brass was appointed. Another four years passed before Judge Uno 
issued his order granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
Thus seven years of post-conviction litigation, fourteen years 
after Petitioner's conviction and sixteen years after the murder 
was committed, have lapsed. Numerous telephone calls were made by 
Petitioner to Mr. Brass's law office over the past several years. 
Only a few of those calls resulted in Petitioner actually speaking 
with Mr. Brass or a member of his legal staff. Nearly a year went 
by where he had no contact with Mr. Brass whatsoever. The evidence 
also shows that there were few court hearings from 1999 through 
2002. In letters to Mr. Brass and in Petitioner's own journal 
entries, he repeatedly expresses frustration with Mr. Brass's 
representation. 
Despite Petitioner's frustrations with Mr. Brass's representa-
tion, his keen awareness of the problems in his case and that any 
delay "might be fatal," and particularly in view of the fact that 
he was proclaiming his innocence, a reasonably prudent person in 
Petitioner's circumstances would have contacted the court about his 
concerns either by mail, by letter, or in person during one of his 
court appearances. Petitioner did not contact the court during the 
entire four years of Mr. Brass's representation prior to the 
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summary judgment being granted. Petitioner was fully aware that 
contacting the court was achievable, based upon his previous 
experience. Indeed, when he became dissatisfied with counsel 
appointed prior to Mr. Brass, he contacted the court, a hearing was 
convened, and prior counsel was replaced by Mr. Brass. In light of 
this evidence, it is the court's conclusion that even though 
Petitioner cannot be held accountable for Mr. Brass's ineffective 
assistance, Petitioner's informed, calculated, repeated, and 
prolonged decisions to keep Mr. Brass as his attorney was objec-
tively unreasonable. Petitioner acted unreasonably. Therefore, it 
is the court's conclusion that it would be inequitable to grant 
Petitioner relief under subsection (b) (1) . 
Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that he is entitled 
to relief under subsection (b) (6) . Utah case law mandates that 
subsection (b) (6) is inapplicable when the grounds asserted for 
relief are encompassed within subsection (b) (1) . Because Peti-
tioner relied upon the negligent conduct of Mr. Brass in asserting 
a claim for relief under subsection (b)(1) and the court determined 
this conduct to be inexcusable, it follows that this same inexcus-
ably negligent conduct cannot constitute "any other reason" for 
relief under subsection (b)(6). Nevertheless, Petitioner argues 
that subsection (b) (1) is reserved exclusively for instances of 
"mere" negligence and, therefore, subsection (b)(6) may be relied 
upon when counsel's conduct is more egregious or "grossly" 
negligent. According to Petitioner, Utah case law suggests that 
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subsection (b) (6) is sufficiently broad to permit a court to set 
aside a judgment because counsel was ineffective. Petitioner also 
contends that his statutory right to counsel would be meaningless 
or illusory if that right did not guarantee effective representa-
tion. However, even assuming that Petitioner's argument has merit 
and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from Mr. 
Brass, he has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under 
subsection (b) (6) . As with subsection (b) (1), whether relief 
should be granted under subsection (b)(6) depends upon the conduct 
of Petitioner and whether he acted as a reasonably prudent person 
would have acted under the circumstances. Petitioner intention-
ally, calculatedly, and repeatedly chose to keep Mr. Brass as 
counsel instead of contacting the court and seeking help. 
Petitioner failed to act as a reasonably prudent person in his 
circumstances would have acted. Therefore, Petitioner is also not 
entitled to relief under subsection (b)(6). 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
HANK GALETKA, Utah State Prison 
Warden 
Respondent. 
ORDER TO DESTROY 
DOCUMENTS 
Case No. 030106629 
JUDGE BRIAN 
On January 5, 2004, petitioner Menzies filed a motion and supporting memorandum 
for a protective order. He also filed an INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS, which identified 
documents that petitioner withheld based on his claims of attorney client and work product 
privileges. An evidentiary hearing in this case was already scheduled for January 15, 2004. 
At a hearing on January 7, 2004, respondent asked for a continuance so that the issue 
concerning the withlield documents and the motion for a protective order could be resolved 
prior to the evidentiary hearing. The motion for a continuance was denied. 
„ ,_ FILED 
WFSTVMtr-YnFPT. 
CLERK OF IHcOISTRlCr COURT Time 
At the hearing on January 7, 2004, petitioner's motion for a protective order was 
denied. The Court ordered petitioner Menzies to turn over all of the documents from the 
INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS, to the respondent. Respondent was allowed to make 
cVorking documents" for the January 15th hearing. Respondent was ordered not to disclose 
the documents or information from the documents to any third parties. No ruling was ever 
entered as to whether the withheld documents were actually privileged. 
At the evidentiary hearing, respondent sought to use and admit as exhibits certain 
items received from the petitioner, which were on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD 
DOCUMENTS list. Petitioner objected. After reviewing the positions of the parties, and after 
re-reading Salt Lake Legal Defender's Assoc, v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997), the Court 
ordered as follows: 
1. Respondent may not use the information from the documents provided from 
petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS to question or cross-examine 
witnesses in the January 15 and 16, 2004 hearing, unless he can show a compelling 
need to use the information, and that there is no alternative means of achieving its 
legitimate purpose. Counsel must approach the bench for the Court's direction prior 
to the use of any information from those documents. 
2. Following conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, respondent shall shred and destroy 
all originals, copies, memorializations, electronic recordings, notes, and all 
perpetuations of the documents which were on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD 
DOCUMENTS, and were provided to respondent by petitioner following the court's 
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ruling on January 7, 2004. This order does not apply to documents or copies of 
documents that were already in respondent's possession, or that were or may be 
provided to respondent from some other source (even though they might be duplicates 
of items on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS). 
Counsel for respondent are under a continuing order not to disseminate information 
obtained from the documents on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS list, 
absent further court order. This order does not apply to information already in 
respondent's possession, or that may be provided to respondent from some other 
source, even though it might be duplicative of information from items on petitioners 
INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS list. In addition, it does not apply to information 
which is now part of the record because it was admitted through testimony or exhibits 
during the evidentiary hearing on January 15 and 16, 2004. 
Counsel for respondent (and their staff) may not investigate matters learned of from 
review of the documents on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS list. 
However, this order does not apply to information respondent learned from other 
sources, even though the information might be duplicative of information contained 
in items on petitioner's INDEX OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS list. In addition, it does 
not apply to information which is now part of the record because it was admitted 
through testimony or exhibits during the evidentiary hearing on January 15 and 16, 
2004. 
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DATED this _ j ^ £. day of April, 2004. 
$£<• 
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JUDGE, TH 
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Approved as to form: 
Counsel for petitioner Menzies 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _[ day of April, 2004,1 served a copy of the foregoing 
STATE'S PROPOSED ORDER TO DESTROY INFORMATION, by causing the same to 
be mailed, via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Elizabeth Hunt 
PO BOX 9419 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109-0419 
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 
GuideUnes 7.1, 10.5, 10.7, 10.8, 10.15.1 
Guideline 7.1 
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases • February 2003 
Guideline 7.1 Monitoring; Removal 
A. The Responsible Agency should monitor the performance of all defense counsel to 
ensure that the client is receiving high quality legal representation. Where there is 
evidence that an attorney is not providing high quality legal representation, the 
Responsible Agency should take appropriate action to protect the interests of the 
attorney's current and potential clients. 
B. The Responsible Agency should establish and publicize a regular procedure for 
investigating and resolving any complaints made by judges, clients, attorneys, or 
others that defense counsel failed to provide high quality legal representation. 
C. The Responsible Agency should periodically review the rosters of attorneys who have 
been certified to accept appointments in capital cases to ensure that those attorneys 
remain capable of providing high quality legal representation. Where there is 
evidence that an attorney has failed to provide high quality legal representation, the 
attorney should not receive additional appointments and should be removed from the 
roster. Where there is evidence that a systemic defect in a defender office has caused 
the office to fail to provide high quality legal representation, the office should not 
receive additional appointments. 
D. Before taking final action making an attorney or a defender office ineligible to receive 
additional appointments, the Responsible Agency should provide written notice that 
such action is being contemplated, and give the attorney or defender office 
opportunity to respond in writing. 
E. An attorney or defender office sanctioned pursuant to this Guideline should be 
restored to the roster only in exceptional circumstances. 
F. The Responsible Agency should ensure that this Guideline is implemented 
consistently with Guideline 2.1(C), so that an attorney's zealous representation of a 
client cannot be cause for the imposition or threatened imposition of sanctions 
pursuant to this Guideline. 
History of Guideline 
In the original edition, this Guideline provided that an attorney should receive no 
additional capital appointments if counsel had "inexcusably ignored basic responsibilities of an 
effective lawyer, resulting in prejudice to the client's case." In this edition, the standard has been 
changed to prohibit future appointment where counsel "has failed to provide high quality legal 
representation." The change was made because the former language was considered insufficiently 
stringent. Subsection B is based on Commentary to the original edition of the Guideline. 
Subsections C-E are taken from Subsections A and C of the original edition of the Guideline. 
Subsection F is new and is intended to emphasize the importance of the principle enunciated in 
Guideline 2.1(C). 
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ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases • February 2003 
Related Standards 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-2.3 
(3d ed. 1992) ("Rotation of assignments and revision of roster"). 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-6.3 
(3ded. 1992) ("Removal"). 
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 10 (2002) 
("Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according 
to nationally and locally adopted standards"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.4 (1989) ("Supervision of Attorneys"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.4.2 (1989) ("Monitoring"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5 (1989). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.1 (1989) ("Penalties Less Thank Removal"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.2 (1989) ("Removal from Program Rosters"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS Standard 4.5.3 (1989) ("Reinstatement After Removal"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.4 (1976) ("Supervision and Evaluation of Defender System 
Personnel"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.5 (1976) ("Monitoring and Evaluation of Assigned Counsel Program 
Personnel"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING 
GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III. 16 (1984) 
("Supervision and Evaluation"). 
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Guideline 10.5 
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases • February 2003 
Guideline 10.5 Relationship with the Client 
A. Counsel at all stages of the case should make every appropriate effort to establish a 
relationship of trust with the client, and should maintain close contact with the client. 
B. 1. Barring exceptional circumstances, an interview of the client should be 
conducted within 24 hours of initial counsel's entry into the case, 
2. Promptly upon entry into the case, initial counsel should communicate in an 
appropriate manner with both the client and the government regarding the 
protection of the client's rights against self-incrimination, to the effective 
assistance of counsel, and to preservation of the attorney-client privilege and 
similar safeguards. 
3. Counsel at all stages of the case should re-advise the client and the government 
regarding these matters as appropriate. 
C. Counsel at all stages of the case should engage in a continuing interactive dialogue 
with the client concerning all matters that might reasonably be expected to have a 
material impact on the case, such as: 
1. the progress of and prospects for the factual investigation, and what assistance 
the client might provide to it; 
2. current or potential legal issues; 
3. the development of a defense theory; 
4. presentation of the defense case; 
5. potential agreed-upon dispositions of the case; 
6. litigation deadlines and the projected schedule of case-related events; and 
7. relevant aspects of the client's relationship with correctional, parole, or other 
governmental agents (e.g., prison medical providers or state psychiatrists). 
History of Guideline 
This Guideline collects, and slightly expands upon, material that was found in Guidelines 
11.4.2, 11.6.1, and 11.8.3 of the original edition. The major revisions make this standard apply to 
all stages of a capital case and note expressly counsel's obligation to discuss potential dispositions 
of the case with the client. 
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Related Standards 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.1 
("Establishment of Relationship"), Standard 4-3.2 ("Interviewing the Client"), Standard 4-3.8 
("Duty to Keep Client Informed"), and Standard 4-5.2 ("Control and Direction of the Case"), in 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d 
ed. 1993). 
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Principle 3 (2002) 
("Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is assigned and notified of appointment, 
as soon as feasible after clients' arrest, detention, or request for counsel"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 1.3(c) ("General Duties of Defense Counsel"), Guideline 
2.2 ("Initial Interview") (1997). 
Commentary 
The Problem 
Immediate contact with the client is necessary not only to gain information needed to 
secure evidence and crucial witnesses, but also to try to prevent uncounseled confessions or 
admissions and to begin to establish a relationship of trust with the client. 
Anyone who has just been arrested and charged with capital murder is likely to be in a 
state of extreme anxiety. Many capital defendants are, in addition, severely impaired in ways that 
make effective communication difficult: they may have mental illnesses or personality disorders 
that make them highly distrustful or impair their reasoning and perception of reality; they may be 
mentally retarded or have other cognitive impairments that affect their judgment and 
understanding; they may be depressed and even suicidal; or they may be in complete denial in the 
face of overwhelming evidence. In fact, the prevalence of mental illness and impaired reasoning 
is so high in the capital defendant population that "[i]t must be assumed that the client is 
emotionally and intellectually impaired."176 There will also often be significant cultural and/or 
language barriers between the client and his lawyers. In many cases, a mitigation specialist, social 
worker or other mental health expert can help identify and overcome these barriers, and assist 
counsel in establishing a rapport with the client. 
See Rick Kammen & Lee Norton, Plea Agreements: Working with Capital Defendants, 
THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 2000, at 31, available at 
http://www.dpa.state.ky.us/library/advocate/marOO/plea.html; see also Lewis, supra note 91, at 
840 (finding 40% of death row inmates to be chronically psychotic); Dorothy O. Lewis et al , 
Neuropsychiatric, psychoeducational, and family characteristics of 14 juveniles condemned to 
death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 585 (1988) (finding 50% of death 
sentenced juveniles in survey suffered from psychosis and all were severely abused as children). 
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Counsel's Duty 
Although ongoing communication by non-attorney members of the defense team is 
important, it does not discharge the obligation of counsel at every stage of the case to keep the 
client informed of developments and progress in the case, and to consult with the client on 
strategic and tactical matters. Some decisions require the client's knowledge and agreement;177 
others, which may be made by counsel, should nonetheless be fully discussed with the client 
beforehand. 
Establishing a relationship of trust with the client is essential both to overcome the client's 
natural resistance to disclosing the often personal and painful facts necessary to present an 
effective penalty phase defense, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 101-04 supra, and to 
ensure that the client will listen to counsel's advice on important matters such as whether to testify 
and the advisability of a plea.178 Client contact must be ongoing. An occasional hurried interview 
with the client will not reveal to counsel all the facts needed to prepare for trial, appeal, post-
conviction review, or clemency. Similarly, a client will not - with good reason - trust a lawyer 
who visits only a few times before trial, does not send or reply to correspondence in a timely 
manner, or refuses to take telephone calls. It is also essential for the defense team to develop a 
relationship of trust with the client's family or others on whom the client relies for support and 
advice. 
Often, so-called "difficult" clients are the consequence of bad lawyering - either in the 
past or present.179 Simply treating the client with respect, listening and responding to his 
concerns, and keeping him informed about the case will often go a long way towards eliciting 
confidence and cooperation.180 
See, e.g., Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000) (ineffective assistance for 
counsel to fail to obtain client's explicit prior consent to strategy of conceding guilt to jury in 
opening statement in effort to preserve credibility for sentencing), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 980 
(2000). 
178
 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-5.2 & cmt., 
in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
(3d ed. 1993). See also Kevin M. Doyle, Heart of the Deal: Ten Suggestions for Plea Bargaining, 
THE CHAMPION, NOV. 1999, at 68 (counsel should not expect client to accept plea bargain unless 
opinion is founded on experience and leg work investigating the case); White, supra note 2, at 
371, 374 (thorough investigation and relationship of trust key to persuading client to accept 
appropriate plea offer). 
179
 See White, supra note 2, at 338 ("Often, capital defendants have had bad prior experiences 
with appointed attorneys, leading them to view such attorneys as 'part of the system' rather than 
advocates who will represent their interests. Appointed capital defense attorneys sometimes 
exacerbate this perception by harshly criticizing their clients' conduct or making it clear that they 
are reluctant to represent them. A capital defendant who experiences, or previously has 
experienced, these kinds of judgments understandably will be reluctant to trust his attorney."). 
180
 A lawyer can frequently earn a client's trust by assisting him with problems he encounters 
in prison or otherwise demonstrating concern for the client's well being and a willingness to 
advocate for him. See id.; Lee Norton, Mitigation Investigation, in FLORIDA PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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Overcoming barriers to communication and establishing a rapport with the client are 
critical to effective representation. Even apart from the need to obtain vital information,181 the 
lawyer must understand the client and his life history.182 To communicate effectively on the 
client's behalf in negotiating a plea, addressing a jury, arguing to a post-conviction court, or 
urging clemency, counsel must be able to humanize the defendant. That cannot be done unless the 
lawyer knows the inmate well enough to be able to convey a sense of truly caring what happens to 
him.183 
Counsel's Duties Respecting Uncooperative Clients 
Some clients will initially insist that they want to be executed - as punishment or because 
they believe they would rather die than spend the rest of their lives in prison; some clients will 
want to contest their guilt but not present mitigation. It is ineffective assistance for counsel to 
simply acquiesce to such wishes, which usually reflect overwhelming feelings of guilt or despair 
rather than a rational decision.184 Counsel should initially try to identify the source of the client's 
hopelessness. Counsel should consult lawyers, clergy or others who have worked with similarly 
situated death row inmates. Counsel should try to obtain treatment for the client's mental and/or 
emotional problems, which may become worse over time. One or more members of the defense 
team should always be available to talk to the client; members of the client's family, friends, or 
clergy might also be enlisted to talk to the client about the reasons for living; inmates who have 
accepted pleas or been on death row and later received a life sentence (or now wish they had), 
may also be a valuable source of information about the possibility of making a constructive life in 
prison. A client who insists on his innocence should be reminded that a waiver of mitigation will 
not persuade an appellate court of his innocence, and securing a life sentence may bar the state 
from seeking death in the event of a new trial. 
ASS'N, DEFENDING A CAPITAL CASE IN FLORIDA 25 (2001). Accordingly, such advocacy is an 
appropriate part of the role of defense counsel in a capital case. Indeed, a lawyer who displays a 
greater concern with habeas corpus doctrine than with recovering the radio that prison authorities 
have confiscated from the client is unlikely to develop the sort of a relationship that will lead to a 
satisfactory legal outcome. 
1 0 1 
One important example is the fact that the client is mentally retarded - a fact that the client 
may conceal with great skill, see, e.g., James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded 
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 484-86 (1985), but one which counsel 
absolutely must know. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002) (holding that 
mentally retarded defendants may not constitutionally be executed). 
182
 See Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 321. 
183
 See Norton, supra note 180, at 5; White, supra note 2, at 374-75 (jury will be less likely to 
empathize with defendant if it does "not perceive a bond between the defendant and his attorney"). 
184
 See infra Guideline 10.7(A) and accompanying Commentary; Kammen & Norton, supra 
note 176, at 32. 
185
 See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 123 
S.Ct. 732 (2003). 
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Counsel in any event should be familiar enough with the client's mental condition to make 
a reasoned decision - fully documented, for the benefit of actors at later stages of the case -
whether to assert the position that the client is not competent to waive further proceedings.186 
The Temporal Scope of Counsel's Duties 
The obligations imposed on counsel by this Guideline apply to all stages of the case. Thus, 
post-conviction counsel, from direct appeal through clemency, must not only consult with the 
client but also monitor the client's personal condition for potential legal consequences.187 For 
example, actions by prison authorities (e.g., solitary confinement, administration of psychotropic 
medications) may impede the ability to present the client as a witness at a hearing,188 and changes 
in the client's mental state (e.g., as a result of the breakup of a close relationship or a worsening 
physical condition) may bear upon his capacity to assist counsel and, ultimately, to be executed.189 
In any event, as already discussed, maintaining an ongoing relationship with the client minimizes 
the possibility that he will engage in counter-productive behavior (e.g., attempt to drop appeals, 
act out before a judge, confess to the media). Thus, the failure to maintain such a relationship is 
professionally irresponsible.190 
186
 See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-402 (1993) (setting forth minimum 
competency standard that the Constitution requires). 
See infra text accompanying note 338. 
188
 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (defendant was constitutionally entitled to 
have administration of anti-psychotic drugs cease before trial). 
189
 See infra text accompanying note 339. 
190
 See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(a) (2002) ("A lawyer shall 
keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information."). 
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Guideline 10.7 Investigation 
A. Counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct thorough and independent 
investigations relating to the issues of both guilt and penalty. 
1. The investigation regarding guilt should be conducted regardless of any 
admission or statement by the client concerning the facts of the alleged crime, 
or overwhelming evidence of guilt, or any statement by the client that evidence 
bearing upon guilt is not to be collected or presented. 
2. The investigation regarding penalty should be conducted regardless of any 
statement by the client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not to be 
collected or presented. 
B. 1. Counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct a full examination of the 
defense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case. This obligation 
includes at minimum interviewing prior counsel and members of the defense 
team and examining the files of prior counsel. 
2. Counsel at every stage have an obligation to satisfy themselves independently 
that the official record of the proceedings is complete and to supplement it as 
appropriate. 
History of Guideline 
This Guideline is based on portions of Guideline 11.4.1 of the original edition. Changes in 
this Guideline clarify that counsel should conduct thorough and independent investigations 
relating to both guilt and penalty issues regardless of overwhelming evidence of guilt, client 
statements concerning the facts of the alleged crime, or client statements that counsel should 
refrain from collecting or presenting evidence bearing upon guilt or penalty. 
Subsection B (1) is new and describes the obligation of counsel at every stage to examine 
the defense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case. Subsection B (2) is also new and 
describes counsel's ongoing obligation to ensure that the official record of proceedings is 
complete. 
Related Standards 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1 ("Duty to 
Investigate"), in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1 (1997) ("Investigation"). 
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Commentary 
At every stage of the proceedings, counsel has a duty to investigate the case thoroughly.193 
This duty is intensified (as are many duties) by the unique nature of the death penalty, has been 
emphasized by recent statutory changes,194 and is broadened by the bifurcation of capital trials.195 
This Guideline outlines the scope of the investigation required a capital case, but is not intended to 
be exhaustive. 
Guilt/Innocence 
As noted supra in the text accompanying notes 47-49, between 1973 and 2002 some 100 
people were freed from death row in the United States on the grounds of innocence.196 
Unfortunately, inadequate investigation by defense attorneys - as well as faulty eyewitness 
identification, coerced confessions, prosecutorial misconduct, false jailhouse informant 
testimony,197 flawed or false forensic evidence,198 and the special vulnerability of juvenile 
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1,4-6.1, 
in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 
(3d ed. 1993); NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 4.1 (1997) ("Investigation"). 
194
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which, as amended by the AEDPA, precludes certain claims 
from federal habeas corpus review if the petitioner "has failed to develop the factual basis" of 
them "in State court proceedings." See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (construing 
this section). 
See generally Lyon, supra note 2; Vick, supra note 3. Numerous courts have found 
counsel to be ineffective when they have failed to conduct an adequate investigation for 
sentencing. See, e.g. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (counsel ineffective for 
failing to uncover and present evidence of defendant's "nightmarish childhood," borderline mental 
retardation, and good conduct in prison); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1070 (11th Circuit 
2002) (counsel ineffective for failing to "investigate, obtain, or present any mitigating evidence to 
the jury, let alone the powerful mitigating evidence of Brownlee's borderline mental retardation, 
psychiatric disorders, and history of drug and alcohol abuse"); infra note 203. 
196
 See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER: Innocence and the Death Penalty, available 
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfor.org/innoc.html (last visited November 5, 2002) (stating that there 
are 102 people that have been wrongly convicted of capital crimes). 
197
 See generally Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (canvassing special 
unreliability of such testimony and restricting its use); supra note 48. 
198
 Recent years have seen a series of scandals involving the prosecution's use, knowingly or 
unknowingly, of scientifically unsupportable or simply fabricated forensic evidence by 
governmental agents. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, OFF. INSP. GEN., The FBILabor-atory: An 
Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives Related and Other 
Cases (1997) (Eighteen-months investigation into charges by whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst 
that FBI Laboratory mishandled "some of the most significant prosecutions in the recent history of 
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suspects - have contributed to wrongful convictions in both capital and noncapital cases.199 In 
capital cases, the mental vulnerabilities of a large portion of the client population compound the 
possibilities for error.200 This underscores the importance of defense counsel's duty to take 
seriously the possibility of the client's innocence,201 to scrutinize carefully the quality of the 
state's case, and to investigate and re-investigate all possible defenses.202 
In this regard, the elements of an appropriate investigation include the following: 
1. Charging Documents: 
Copies of all charging documents in the case should be obtained and 
examined in the context of the applicable law to identify: 
a. the elements of the charged offense(s), including the element(s) 
alleged to make the death penalty applicable; 
b. the defenses, ordinary and affirmative, that may be available to the 
substantive charge and to the applicability of the death penalty; 
c. any issues, constitutional or otherwise, (such as statutes of 
limitations or double jeopardy) that can be raised to attack the 
charging documents; and 
the Department of Justice" finds "significant instances of testimonial errors, substandard 
analytical work, and deficient practices"); Paul C. Gianelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in 
Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 
442-69 (1997) (summarizing numerous cases); supra note 49. 
199
 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW 
TO MAKE IT RIGHT (Signet 2001 ed.). 
200
 See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2251-52 (2002) ("Mentally retarded 
defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor 
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their 
crimes."); see also Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (same), cert denied, 450 U.S. 
1001 (1981). 
As this Guideline emphasizes, that is so even where circumstances appear overwhelmingly 
indicative of guilt. A recent study that includes both capital and non-capital DNA exonerations 
has found that in 23 percent of the cases the client had confessed notwithstanding his innocence. 
See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 199, at 92. See also Dan Morain, Blind Justice; John Cherry's 
Killing Left Many Victims; Was the Accused One of Them? L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1989, View, at 6 
(noting that Jerry Bigelow confessed many times, including to the media and was eventually 
found to be innocent). 
See Steven M. Pincus, "It's Good to be Free ": An Essay About the Exoneration of Albert 
Burrell, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 27, 33 (2001). 
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d. defense counsel's right to obtain information in the possession of the 
government, and the applicability and validity of any obligation that 
might arise to provide reciprocal discovery. 
2. Potential Witnesses: 
a. Barring exceptional circumstances, counsel should seek out and 
interview potential witnesses, including, but not limited to: 
(1) eyewitnesses or other witnesses having purported knowledge 
of events surrounding the alleged offense itself; 
(2) potential alibi witness; 
(3) witnesses familiar with aspects of the client's life history that 
might affect the likelihood that the client committed the 
charged offense(s), the degree of culpability for the offense, 
including: 
(a) members of the client's immediate and extended family 
(b) neighbors, friends and acquaintances who knew the client or 
his family 
(c) former teachers, clergy, employers, co-workers, social 
service providers, and doctors 
(d) correctional, probation or parole officers; 
(4) members of the victim's family. 
b. Counsel should conduct interviews of potential witnesses in the 
presence of a third person so that there is someone to call as a 
defense witness at trial. Alternatively, counsel should have an 
investigator or mitigation specialist conduct the interviews. Counsel 
should investigate all sources of possible impeachment of defense 
and prosecution witnesses. 
3. The Police and Prosecution: 
Counsel should make efforts to secure information in the possession of the 
prosecution or law enforcement authorities, including police reports, 
autopsy reports, photos, video or audio tape recordings, and crime scene 
and crime lab reports. Where necessary, counsel should pursue such efforts 
through formal and informal discovery. 
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4. Physical Evidence: 
Counsel should make a prompt request to the police or investigative agency 
for any physical evidence or expert reports relevant to the offense or 
sentencing. With the assistance of appropriate experts, counsel should then 
aggressively re-examine all of the government's forensic evidence, and 
conduct appropriate analyses of all other available forensic evidence. 
5. The Scene: 
Counsel should view the scene of the alleged offense as soon as possible. 
This should be done under circumstances as similar as possible to those 
existing at the time of the alleged incident (e.g., weather, time of day, and 
lighting conditions). 
Penalty 
Counsel's duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence is now well established.203 
The duty to investigate exists regardless of the expressed desires of a client.204 Nor may counsel 
"sit idly by, thinking that investigation would be futile."205 Counsel cannot responsibly advise a 
2Ui
 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (counsel ineffective for failing 
to uncover and present evidence of defendant's "nightmarish childhood," borderline mental 
retardation, and good conduct in prison); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of client's brain damage due to 
prolonged pesticide exposure and repeated head injuries, and failing to present expert testimony 
explaining "the effects of the severe physical, emotional, and psychological abuse to which Caro 
was subjected as a child"), cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 2645 (2002); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 
417, 449-51 (6th Cir. 2001) (though counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence is well 
established, counsel failed to investigate and present evidence that defendant had been abandoned 
as an infant in a garbage can by his mentally ill mother, was raised in a brothel run by his 
grandmother where he was exposed to group sex, bestiality and pedophilia, and suffered from 
probable brain damage and borderline personality disorder), cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 1639 (2002); 
Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 307-08 (3d Cir. 2001) (counsel ineffective for failing to investigate 
and present evidence of defendant's abusive childhood and "psychiatric testimony explaining how 
Jermyn's development was thwarted by the torture and psychological abuse he suffered as a 
child"); supra note 195. 
204
 See Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-03 (11th Cir. 1991) (counsel ineffective for 
"latch[ing] onto" client's assertions he did not want to call penalty phase witnesses and failing to 
conduct an investigation sufficient to allow their client to make an informed decision to waive 
mitigation), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 837 (1989); see also Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1136-41 
(9th Cir. 2002), petition for cert, filed (U.S. Sept. 13, 2002) (No. 02-434). 
205
 Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp. 901, 910 (N.D. Miss. 1980); accord Austin v. Bell, 126 
F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 1997) (counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at 
the penalty phase of the trial, on grounds that he "did not think that it would do any good," 
constituted ineffective assistance), cert, denied, 523 U.S. 1079 (1998). 
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client about the merits of different courses of action, the client cannot make informed decisions, 
and counsel cannot be sure of the client's competency to make such decisions, unless counsel has 
first conducted a thorough investigation with respect to both phases of the case.206 
Because the sentencer in a capital case must consider in mitigation, "anything in the life of 
the defendant which might militate against the appropriateness of the death penalty for the 
defendant,"207 "penalty phase preparation requires extensive and generally unparalleled 
investigation into personal and family history." In the case of the client, this begins with the 
moment of conception.209 Counsel needs to explore: 
(1) Medical history (including hospitalizations, mental and physical 
illness or injury, alcohol and drug use, pre-natal and birth trauma, 
malnutrition, developmental delays, and neurological damage); 
(2) Family and social history (including physical, sexual or emotional abuse; 
family history of mental illness, cognitive impairments, substance abuse, or 
domestic violence; poverty, familial instability, neighborhood environment 
and peer influence); other traumatic events such as exposure to criminal 
violence, the loss of a loved one or a natural disaster; experiences of racism 
or other social or ethnic bias; cultural or religious influences; failures of 
government or social intervention (e.g., failure to intervene or provide 
2U0
 See, e.g., Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 123 S. Ct. 
342 (2002); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 447 (6th Cir. 2001), cert, denied, 122 S. Ct. 1639 
(2002); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In addition to hampering 
[defense counsel's] ability to make strategic decisions, [defense counsel's] failure to investigate 
[defendant's background] clearly affected his ability to competently advise [defendant] regarding 
the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible mitigation strategies."); United 
States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[C]ounsel can hardly be said to have made a 
strategic choice against pursuing a certain line of investigation when s/he has not yet obtained the 
facts on which such a decision could be made."); Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344, 1350 (5th 
Cir. 1984) (petitioner entitled to relief if record shows that "counsel could not make a valid 
strategic choice because he had made no investigation"), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 924 (1984). 
207
 Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1988) (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 
(1987)). See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
208
 Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 
1999, at 35; see also, ABA Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Delegates (Feb. 
1990), reprinted in Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty 
Cases, supra note 84, at 63. 
209
 Norton, supra note 180, at 2 (mitigation investigation must encompass client's "whole 
life"); EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE OF ALA., ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL ch. 12 
(3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL]; Lyon, supra note 2, at 
703 (observing that "mitigation begins with the onset of the [defendant's] life" because "[m]any 
[defendants'] problems start with things like fetal alcohol syndrome, head trauma at birth, or their 
mother's drug addiction during pregnancy"); Vick, supra note 3, at 363. 
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necessary services, placement in poor quality foster care or juvenile 
detention facilities); 
(3) Educational history (including achievement, performance, behavior, and 
activities), special educational needs (including cognitive limitations and 
learning disabilities) and opportunity or lack thereof, and activities; 
(4) Military service, (including length and type of service, conduct, special 
training, combat exposure, health and mental health services); 
(5) Employment and training history (including skills and performance, and 
barriers to employ ability); 
(6) Prior juvenile and adult correctional experience (including conduct while 
under supervision, in institutions of education or training, and regarding 
clinical services); 
The mitigation investigation should begin as quickly as possible, because it may 
affect the investigation of first phase defenses (e.g., by suggesting additional areas for questioning 
police officers or other witnesses), decisions about the need for expert evaluations (including 
competency, mental retardation, or insanity), motion practice, and plea 
negotiations.210 
Accordingly, immediately upon counsel's entry into the case appropriate 
member(s) of the defense team should meet with the client to: 
1. discuss the alleged offense or events giving rise to the charge(s), and any 
improper police investigative practice or prosecutorial conduct which 
affects the client's rights; 
2. explore the existence of other potential sources of information relating to 
the offense, the client's mental state, and the presence or absence of any 
aggravating factors under the applicable death penalty statute and any 
mitigating factors; and 
3. obtain necessary releases for securing confidential records relating to any of 
the relevant histories. 
Counsel should bear in mind that much of the information that must be elicited for the 
sentencing phase investigation is very personal and may be extremely difficult for the client to 
discuss. Topics like childhood sexual abuse should therefore not be broached in an initial 
interview. Obtaining such information typically requires overcoming considerable barriers, such 
as shame, denial and repression, as well as other mental or emotional impairments from which the 
client may suffer. As noted supra in the text accompanying note 101, a mitigation specialist who 
is trained to recognize and overcome these barriers, and who has the skills to help the client cope 
710 
See supra text accompanying notes 11-26. 
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with the emotional impact of such painful disclosures, is invaluable in conducting this aspect of 
the investigation. 
It is necessary to locate and interview the client's family members (who may suffer from 
some of the same impairments as the client), and virtually everyone else who knew the client and 
his family, including neighbors, teachers, clergy, case workers, doctors, correctional, probation or 
parole officers, and others.211 Records - from courts, government agencies, the military, 
employers, etc. - can contain a wealth of mitigating evidence, documenting or providing clues to 
childhood abuse, retardation, brain damage, and/or mental illness,212 and corroborating witnesses' 
recollections. Records should be requested concerning not only the client, but also his parents, 
grandparents, siblings, and children. A multi-generational investigation frequently discloses 
significant patterns of family dysfunction and may help establish or strengthen a diagnosis or 
underscore the hereditary nature of a particular impairment.214 The collection of corroborating 
information from multiple sources - a time- consuming task - is important wherever possible to 
ensure the reliability and thus the persuasiveness of the evidence.215 
? 11 
Goodpaster, supra note 2, at 321; Lyon, supra note 2, at 703-04; Vick, supra note 3, at 
366-67. 
212
 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000) (counsel ineffective where they "failed 
to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing 
Williams' nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they 
incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. Had they done so, the jury would 
have learned that Williams' parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and 
his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been 
committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents' 
incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were 
released from prison, had been returned to his parents' custody.") (footnote omitted); Jermyn v. 
Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (counsel ineffective for failing to obtain school records 
that disclosed childhood abuse); see also ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 
209; TEXAS DEATH PENALTY MITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 103, ch. 3; Norton, supra note 
180, at 32-38. 
213
 In order to verify or corroborate witness testimony about circumstances and events in the 
defendant's life, defense counsel must "assemble the documentary record of the defendant's life, 
collecting school, work, and prison records "which might serve as sources of relevant facts. Vick, 
supra note 3, at 367; see also Lyon, supra note 2, at 705-06. 
214
 Norton, supra note 180, at 3 (counsel should "investigate at least three generations" of the 
client's family). 
215
 See id. (advocating "triangulation" of data). 
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Counsel should use all appropriate avenues including signed releases, subpoenas, court 
orders, and requests or litigation pursuant to applicable open records statutes, to obtain all 
potentially relevant information pertaining to the client, his or her siblings and parents, and other 
family members, including but not limited to: 
a. school records 
b. social service and welfare records 
c. juvenile dependency or family court records 
d. medical records 
e. military records 
f. employment records 
g. criminal and correctional records 
h. family birth, marriage, and death records 
i. alcohol and drug abuse assessment or treatment records 
j . INS records 
If the client was incarcerated, institutionalized or placed outside of the home, as either a 
juvenile or an adult, the defense team should investigate the possible effect of the facility's 
conditions on the client's contemporaneous and later conduct.216 The investigation should also 
explore the adequacy of institutional responses to childhood trauma, mental illness or disability to 
determine whether the client's problems were ever accurately identified or properly addressed.217 
The circumstances of a particular case will often require specialized research and expert 
consultation. For example, if a client grew up in a migrant farm worker community, counsel 
should investigate what pesticides the client may have been exposed to and their possible effect on 
a child's developing brain.218 If a client is a relatively recent immigrant, counsel must learn about 
the client's culture, about the circumstances of his upbringing in his country of origin, and about 
the difficulties the client's immigrant community faces in this country.219 
See TERRY KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND 
WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT (1999). 
917 
See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement 
and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1467 (1997) (noting damaging 
effects of "social conditions and experiences" often inflicted on institutionalized juvenile 
offenders). 
218
 See Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2002), cert, denied, 122 S.Ct. 2645 (2002) 
(described supra note 203). 
219
 See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992) (positive testimony from defendant's 
family, combined with expert testimony about difficulty of adolescent immigrants from Hong 
Kong assimilating to North America would have humanized client and could have resulted in a 
life sentence for defendant convicted of 13 murders). 
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Miscellaneous Concerns 
Counsel should maintain copies of media reports about the case for various purposes, 
including to support a motion for change of venue, if appropriate, to assist in voir dire of the jury 
regarding the effects of pretrial publicity, to monitor the public statements of potential witnesses, 
and to facilitate the work of counsel who might be involved in later stages of the case. 
Counsel must also investigate prior convictions, adjudications, or unadjudicated offenses 
that could be used as aggravating circumstances or otherwise come into evidence. If a prior 
conviction is legally flawed, counsel should seek to have it set aside.220 Counsel may also find 
extenuating circumstances that can be offered to lessen the weight of a conviction, adjudication, or 
9? i 
unadjudicated offense. 
Additional investigation may be required to provide evidentiary support for other legal 
issues in the case, such as challenging racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty 
or in the composition of juries.222 Whether within the criminal case or outside it, counsel has a 
duty to pursue appropriate remedies if the investigation reveals that such conditions exist.223 
As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 247-59, counsel should consider making 
overtures to members of the victim's family - possibly through an intermediary, such as a clergy 
person, defense-victim liaison, or representative of an organization such as Murder Victim's 
Families for Reconciliation - to ascertain their feelings about the death penalty and/or the 
possibility of a plea. 
220 
221 
222 
See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 586 (1988); supra note 6. 
See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. 
See, e.g., Miller-el v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 431659 ***cite to sec. 1(B)*** (U.S. Feb. 25, 
2003) (ruling for habeas petitioner in reliance on evidence presented at hearings on jury 
discrimination claim conducted prior to trial and in state post-conviction proceedings); Sara 
Rimer, In Dallas, Dismissal of Black Jurors Leads to Appeal by Death Row Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 13, 2002, at A24 (discussing memoranda and training manuals from prosecutor's office 
documenting policy of racial discrimination injury selection); Stephen B. Bright, Challenging 
Racial Discrimination in Capital Cases, THE CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 22. 
223 
224 
See supra Guideline 10.10.2; text accompanying note 7. 
See Russell Stetler, Working with the Victim's Survivors in Death Penalty Cases, THE 
CHAMPION, June 1999, at 42; see also Michael Janofsky, Parents of Gay Obtain Mercy for His 
Killer, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 5, 1999, at Al (stating that the prosecutor decided to drop the death 
penalty in the Matthew Shepard case because the parents of the victim requested him to do so). 
Guideline 10.8 
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Guideline 10.8 The Duty to Assert Legal Claims 
A. Counsel at every stage of the case, exercising professional judgment in accordance 
with these Guidelines, should: 
1. consider all legal claims potentially available; and 
2. thoroughly investigate the basis for each potential claim before reaching a 
conclusion as to whether it should be asserted; and 
3. evaluate each potential claim in light of: 
a. the unique characteristics of death penalty law and practice; and 
b. the near certainty that all available avenues of post-conviction relief 
will be pursued in the event of conviction and imposition of a death 
sentence; and 
c. the importance of protecting the client's rights against later contentions 
by the government that the claim has been waived, defaulted, not 
exhausted, or otherwise forfeited; and 
d. any other professionally appropriate costs and benefits to the assertion 
of the claim. 
B. Counsel who decide to assert a particular legal claim should: 
1. present the claim as forcefully as possible, tailoring the presentation to the 
particular facts and circumstances in the client's case and the applicable law 
in the particular jurisdiction; and 
2. ensure that a full record is made of all legal proceedings in connection with the 
claim. 
C. Counsel at all stages of the case should keep under consideration the possible 
advantages to the client of: 
1. asserting legal claims whose basis has only recently become known or 
available to counsel; and 
2. supplementing claims previously made with additional factual or legal 
information. 
History of Guideline 
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.5.1 (The Decision to File Pretrial Motions) and 
Guideline 11.7.3 (Objection to Error and Preservation of Issues for Post Judgment Review) of the 
original edition. New language makes clear that the obligations imposed by this Guideline exist at 
every stage of the proceeding and extend to procedural vehicles other than the submission of 
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motions to the trial court. 
In Subsection A (3)(b), the phrase "near certainty" is new and replaces the word 
"likelihood" from the original edition. The change reflects recent scholarship indicating that 
appellate and post-conviction remedies are pursued by almost 100% of capital defendants who are 
convicted and sentenced to death. 
Subsections B and C are new to this edition. 
Related Standards 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.6 ("Prompt 
Action to Protect the Accused") and Standard 4-4.5 ("Compliance with Discovery Procedure"), in 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d 
ed. 1993). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 5.1 ("The Decision to File Pretrial Motions"). 
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
REPRESENTATION (1995), Guideline 5.3 ("Subsequent Filing of Pretrial Motions"). 
Commentary 
"One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case at trial is the 
preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage of appellate and post-conviction 
review. Failure to preserve an issue may result in the client being executed even though reversible 
error occurred at trial."225 For this reason, trial counsel in a death penalty case must be especially 
aware not only of strategies for winning at trial,226 but also of the heightened need to fully 
preserve all potential issues for later review. 
As the text of the first sentence of Subsection A makes clear, this obligation is not limited 
to trial counsel or to motions made to the trial court. For example, if a state post-conviction court 
rules on the merits of a claim for relief, the claim will be available for federal review even if the 
Stephen B. Bright, Preserving Error at Capital Trials, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1997, at 42-
43. For example, John Eldon Smith was executed by the State of Georgia even though he was 
sentenced to death by a jury selected from a jury pool from which women were unconstitutionally 
excluded. The federal courts refused to consider the issue because Mr. Smith's lawyers failed to 
preserve it. Mr. Smith's co-defendant was also sentenced to death from a jury selected from the 
same pool. The issue was preserved in the co-defendant's case, and the co-defendant's conviction 
and death sentence were vacated. At retrial, the co-defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (11th Cir. 1983) (Hatchett, J., dissenting in part), cert, 
denied, 464 U.S. 1003(1983). 
226
 See NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION Guideline 5.1 (1995) (listing potential motions). 
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state's rules required the issue to be raised at trial.227 So, too, it may be appropriate for counsel to 
proceed on some claims (e.g., double jeopardy) by seeking an interlocutory supervisory writ from 
an appellate court228 or by otherwise seeking relief outside the confines of the capital litigation 
itself.229 
As discussed in the text accompanying note 27 supra, most jurisdictions have strict waiver 
rules that will forestall post-judgment relief if an issue was not litigated at the first opportunity. 
An issue may be waived not only by the failure to timely file a pretrial motion, but also because of 
the lack of a contemporaneous objection at trial, or the failure to request a jury instruction, or 
counsel's failure to comply with some other procedural requirement established by statute, court 
rule or caselaw. Counsel must therefore know and follow the procedural requirements for issue 
preservation and act with the understanding that the failure to raise an issue by motion, objection 
or other appropriate procedure may well forfeit the ability of the client to obtain relief on that 
issue in subsequent proceedings. 
Whether raising an issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting individual, 
sequestered voir dire on death-qualification of the jury) or a more common motion shaped by the 
capital aspect of the case (such as requesting a change of venue because of publicity), counsel 
should be sure to litigate all of the possible legal230 and factual231 bases for the request. This will 
227
 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985); see also Stewart v. Smith, 122 S. Ct. 2578 
(2002) (per curiam), 
228
 See, e.g., Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46,454 N.E.2d 522, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1983) 
(granting writ of prohibition sought by non-capital suspect to preclude investigation by improperly 
designated prosecutor). Cf Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 684 N.Y.S.2d 177 
(1998) (invalidating portion of New York death penalty statute in proceeding for writ of 
prohibition brought by prosecutor), cert, denied, 527 U.S. 1015 (1999). 
See supra text accompanying notes 4-8. 
230
 Counsel should always cite to any arguably applicable provision of the United States 
Constitution, the state constitution, and state law as bases for granting a claim. A reviewing court 
may refuse to consider a legal theory different from that put forward originally. See Anderson v. 
Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (refusing to consider violation of Due Process Clause of federal 
constitution because defense counsel in state courts relied solely upon due process clause of state 
constitution). For example, courts have refused to consider an assertion that a statement was taken 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it was argued in earlier proceedings 
only that the statement was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). Counsel should also present all of 
the relevant facts at as early as feasible. See generally Bright, supra note 225, at 43, 44. 
231
 In this regard, as Subsection C indicates, counsel should bear in mind that in capital 
litigation the courts tend to be much more responsive to supplemental presentations than they 
might be in other contexts. See, e.g., Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1982); Spaziano v. 
State, 660 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1995) (granting motions filed by defendant facing fifth death warrant 
that "seek to open by rehearing an appeal that was finalized more than thirteen years ago and a 
postconviction proceeding that was terminated with a denial of rehearing more than nine years 
ago," and ordering a remand that eventually resulted in an in-court recantation by a key witness 
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increase the likelihood that the request will be granted and will also fully preserve the issue for 
post-conviction review in the event the claim is denied. 
Because of the possibility that the client will be sentenced to death, counsel must be 
significantly more vigilant about litigating all potential issues at all levels in a capital case than in 
any other case.232 As described in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, counsel also has a duty to 
preserve issues calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life may well depend on 
how zealously counsel discharges this duty.233 Counsel should object to anything that appears 
unfair or unjust even if it involves challenging well-accepted practices.234 
Because "[preserving all possible grounds can be very difficult in the heat of battle during 
trial,"235 counsel should file written motions in limine prior to trial raising any issues that counsel 
anticipate will arise at trial. All of the grounds should be set out in the motion.236 Similarly, 
requests for rulings during the course of post-conviction proceedings (e.g., for investigative 
resources) should be made fully and formally. 
and a life sentence, see DNA Tests to be Done in 74 Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 13, 2002 at 
B3). 
7"\1 
See Bright, supra note 225, at 43 ("Failure to make an objection for fear of alienating the 
judge or jury may be a valid consideration in a case in which there is a good chance of acquittal or 
the length of sentence will be so short that appellate review will be irrelevant to the client. But in 
a capital case, it may deprive the client of a life-saving reversal on direct appeal or in habeas 
corpus proceedings."). 
See supra text accompanying note 27. If a claim, whether then meritorious or not, is being 
litigated anywhere in the country, counsel is likely to be charged with knowledge that the "tools to 
construct their constitutional claim" exist and be expected to raise it. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 
107, 133 (1982). In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), counsel failed to raise a "losing" issue 
on behalf of Mr. Smith in one state court because the state supreme court had recently held the 
issue was meritless. Mr. Smith raised the issue in all subsequent state and federal proceedings, 
and, well before these were concluded, the United States Supreme Court ruled favorably on the 
question. However, because of counsel's previous decision to forego the presentation of a claim 
that was then meritless, Mr. Smith was executed. 
For example, execution by electrocution has become de facto unconstitutional because 
state governments have concluded that challenges to the practice have merit, even though the 
contrary precedent remains in place. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); compare Alabama: 
Optional Execution by Injection, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2002, at A20 (discussing how Alabama 
enacted a law making lethal injection the state's primary method of execution when it looked as if 
the Supreme Court might rule that the electric chair was cruel and unusual punishment); Sarah 
Rimer, Florida Lawmakers Reject Electric Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at A13 (same in 
Florida). 
235
 Bright, supra note 225, at 45. 
236 See ALABAMA CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL, supra note 209, at 53. 
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In accordance with Subsection B (2), counsel should ensure that there is a complete record 
respecting all claims that are made, including objections, motions, statements of grounds, 
questioning of witnesses or venire members, oral and written arguments of both sides, discussions 
among counsel and the court, evidence proffered and received, rulings of the court, reasons given 
by the court for its rulings, and any agreements reached between the parties. If a court refuses to 
allow a proceeding to be recorded, counsel should state the objection to the court's refusal, to the 
substance of the court's ruling, and then at the first available opportunity make a record of what 
transpired in the unrecorded proceeding.237 Counsel should also ensure that the record is clear 
with regard to the critical facts to support the claim. For example, if counsel objects to the 
peremptory strike of a juror as race-based, counsel should ensure that it is clear from the record 
not only that the prosecutor struck a particular juror, but the race of the juror, of every other 
member of the venire, and the extent to which the unchallenged venire members shared the 
characteristics claimed to be justifying the challenge.238 
Further, as reflected in Guideline 10.7(B)(2), counsel at all stages of the case must 
determine independently whether the existing official record may incompletely reflect the 
proceedings, e.g., because the court reporter took notes but did not transcribe them or because the 
court clerk does not include legal memoranda in the record transmitted to subsequent courts, or 
because of official negligence or misconduct. 
As the nonexclusive list of considerations in Subsection A (3) suggests, there are many 
instances in which counsel should assert legal claims even though their prospects of immediate 
success on the merits is at best modest. Examples of such circumstances (in addition to those in 
which counsel needs to forestall later procedural defenses (Subsection A (3)(c)), include instances 
where: 
the claim should be preserved in light of foreseeable future events (e.g., the 
completion of an investigation, a ruling in a relevant case); or 
asserting the claim may increase the government's incentive to reach an agreed-
upon disposition;239 or the presentation made in support of the claim may favorably 
influence other relevant actors (e.g., the Governor). 
151
 See Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357 (1993); Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 714-15 
(Tex. 1972); 4M Linen Co. v. W.P. Balard & Co., 793 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App. 1990), writ 
denied (Oct 31, 1990), rehearing of writ of error overruled (Jan 9, 1991). 
238
 Bright, supra note 225, at 46. 
2 3 9
 See 3 CAL. ATT'YS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE, 3 CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL 
4(1993ed.). 
on 
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Guideline 10.15.1 Duties of Post-Conviction Counsel 
A. Counsel representing a capital client at any point after conviction should be familiar 
with the jurisdiction's procedures for setting execution dates and providing notice of 
them. Post-conviction counsel should also be thoroughly familiar with all available 
procedures for seeking a stay of execution. 
B. If an execution date is set, post-conviction counsel should immediately take all 
appropriate steps to secure a stay of execution and pursue those efforts through all 
available fora. 
C. Post-conviction counsel should seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously 
presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to high 
quality capital defense representation, including challenges to any overly restrictive 
procedural rules. Counsel should make every professionally appropriate effort to 
present issues in a manner that will preserve them for subsequent review. 
D. The duties of the counsel representing the client on direct appeal should include filing 
a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. If appellate 
counsel does not intend to file such a petition, he or she should immediately notify 
successor counsel if known and the Responsible Agency. 
E. Post-conviction counsel should fully discharge the ongoing obligations imposed by 
these Guidelines, including the obligations to: 
1. maintain close contact with the client regarding litigation developments; and 
2. continually monitor the client's mental, physical and emotional condition for 
effects on the client's legal position; 
3. keep under continuing review the desirability of modifying prior counsel's 
theory of the case in light of subsequent developments; and 
4. continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case. 
History of Guideline 
This Guideline is based on Guideline 11.9.3 of the original edition. Subsections A, B, and 
D are entirely new. Subsection C includes new language regarding the manner in which post-
conviction counsel must present all arguably meritorious issues. Subsection E includes new 
language emphasizing the ongoing obligations imposed by these Guidelines upon post-conviction 
counsel. 
Related Standards 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-8.5 ("Post-
Conviction Remedies") in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993). 
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Commentary 
Almost all of the duties imposed by Guidelines 10.3 et seq. are applicable in the post-
conviction context. Subsection E notes this by way of reminder. Post-conviction counsel should 
consult those Guidelines and accompanying commentaries. 
The Paramount Duty to Obtain a Stay 
No matter how compelling the client's post-conviction case may be, he faces the risk that 
his execution will moot it.331 This is a phenomenon unique to capital litigation and one that must 
be uppermost in the mind of post-conviction counsel. 
When states fail to provide post-conviction counsel entirely or in a timely manner,332 or 
request the setting of an execution date to advance the litigation,333 or impose short periods of time 
for filing substantive post-judgment pleadings, the result is emergency requests for stays of 
execution so that substantive pleadings will be considered.334 Although the ABA and other 
331
 See Brooks v. Estelle, 702 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1983) (dismissing appeal, which had received 
certificate of probable cause from district court, as moot since petitioner had been executed 
following the denial of a stay by Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
332
 There is no right to state post-conviction counsel in Georgia. Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 
855, 513 S.E.2d 186, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999). In August 1996, Georgia Supreme Court 
Justice Robert Benham noted that several persons under sentence of death in Georgia were in 
"immediate need of legal representation," and asked area law firms to volunteer. One Atlanta 
civil firm that volunteered was assigned the case of Marcus Wellons. Three days after the firm 
received a copy of the trial transcript, the trial court set an execution date for two weeks later. 
The firm rushed to the Georgia Supreme Court and asked for more time to submit a formal post-
conviction petition. Hours before Mr. Wellons's scheduled execution, the Court denied the 
request by a 4-3 vote. As guards were about to shave Mr. Wellons's head for that evening's 
electrocution, the federal district court granted a stay of execution. State counsel and the federal 
defender were given ten months to prepare the federal petition. Bill Rankin, When Death Row 
Inmates Go To Court Without Lawyers: In the Late Stages of Their Fight to Stay Alive, Some 
Must Represent Themselves, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 29, 1996, at D5; Bill Rankin & Rhonda 
Cook, Death Penalty: Sudden Speed, Then a Delay, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 13, 1996, at Al. 
333
 For example, in Kentucky capital cases the Attorney General invariably requests an 
execution date at the end of direct appeal, and the Governor invariably signs the death warrant. 
No stay of execution may be granted until the state post-conviction petition is filed. As a result, 
in order to obtain a stay, counsel must often file a state post-conviction petition well before the 
time allowed under state law because there is an outstanding execution date. The practice is the 
same in federal habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Execution of Killer Delayed, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER, June 9, 2000, at DIB. 
334
 When a capital case enters a phase of being "under warrant" - i.e., when a death warrant 
has been signed - time commitments for counsel increase, "due in large part to the necessary 
duplication of effort in the preparation of several petitions which might have to be filed 
simultaneously in different courts." Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defense, ABA 
Bar Information Program, Time & Expense Analysis in Postconviction Death Penalty Cases, Feb. 
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professional voices have repeatedly condemned this system, defense counsel must make the 
best of it - by seeking stays or reprieves from any available source and challenging the unfairness 
of any overly restrictive constraints on filing of substantive pleadings and/or stays. 
And to the extent that counsel can responsibly reduce the stresses imposed upon the client 
by this often-nightmarish system, counsel should of course do so (e.g., by reassuring the client of 
the unlikelihood of the execution actually occurring on its nominal date, notwithstanding the 
alarming preparations being made by the prison).336 
Keeping the Client Whole 
Even if their executions have been safely stayed, however, the mental condition of many 
capital clients will deteriorate the longer they remain on death row. This may result in suicidal 
tendencies and/or impairments in realistic perception and rational decisionmaking.337 Counsel 
should seek to minimize this risk by staying in close contact with the client.338 
Counsel's ongoing monitoring of the client's status, required by Subsection E(2), also has 
a strictly legal purpose. As described in the text accompanying notes 187-90 supra, a worsening 
in the client's mental condition may directly affect the legal posture of the case and the lawyer 
needs to be aware of developments. For example, the case establishing the proposition that insane 
1987, at 10. 
335
 See, ABA House of Delegates Res. 15, Rec. 11 (adopted Feb. 13, 1990) (calling for 
automatic federal stays throughout post-conviction period) reprinted in Toward a More Just and 
Effective System of Review, supra note 84, at 38; Legislative Modification, supra note 11, at 855 
("We agree with the Powell Committee [appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to study reform of 
capital habeas corpus] that the current mechanisms for obtaining stays of execution are irrational 
and indefensible. At best, they lead to an enormous waste of legal effort by all participants in the 
system, and at worst they result in inconsistencies that have fatal consequences."); Eric M. 
Freedman, Can Justice Be Served by Appeals of the Dead?, NATL. L.J., Oct. 19, 1992, at 13 
(current situation respecting stays is "no way to run a judicial system"). 
336
 See, e.g., Williams v. Missouri, 463 U.S. 1301 (1983) (Blackmun, J., in chambers) 
(executions scheduled for prior to the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari on direct 
appeal would be stayed "as a matter of course"); McDonald v. Missouri, 464 U.S. 1306 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., in chambers) ("I thought I had advised the Supreme Court of Missouri once 
before, in Williams, that. . . I . . . shall stay the execution of any Missouri applicant whose direct 
review of his conviction is being sought and has not been completed. I repeat the admonition to 
the Supreme Court of Missouri, and to any official within the State's chain of responsibility, that 
I shall continue that practice. The stay, of course, ought to be granted by the state tribunal in the 
first instance, but, if it fails to fulfill its responsibility, I shall fulfill mine.") 
See C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death 
Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 850 (2000) (noting that between 1977 and 
March 1998, 59 condemned inmates had volunteered for execution, compared to 382 executed 
unwillingly). 
See supra text accompanying notes 187-90. 
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persons cannot be executed was heavily based on notes on the client's mental status that 
counsel had kept over a period of months. 
The Labyrinth of Post-conviction Litigation 
A. The Direct Appeal 
Practice varies among jurisdictions as to the limits of the appellate process and the 
relationship between direct appeals and collateral post-conviction challenges to a conviction or 
sentence.340 Issues that are only partially or minimally reflected by the record, or that are outside 
the record, should be explored by appellate counsel as a predicate for informed decision making 
about legal strategy. 
As Subsection C emphasizes, it is of critical importance that counsel on direct appeal 
proceed, like all post-conviction counsel, in a manner that maximizes the client's ultimate chances 
of success. "Winnowing" issues in a capital appeal can have fatal consequences. Issues 
abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another case and ultimately 
successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed later.341 When a client will be killed if the case is lost, 
counsel should not let any possible ground for relief go unexplored or unexploited.342 
Jjy
 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
In some states, there is a unitary appeal system in which direct appeal and collateral 
challenges such as ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised simultaneously. See, e.g., 
IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Michie Supp. 2000). In other jurisdictions, ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims generally may not be raised on direct appeal but are reserved for separate post-
conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 691 So. 2d 1068, 1074 (Fla. 1997) (claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel not cognizable on direct appeal) cert, denied, 522 U.S. 880 
(1997). 
341
 For example, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), appellate counsel failed to assert 
on direct appeal that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by the testimony 
of a psychiatrist who had examined the defendant without warning him the interview could be 
used against him. The Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims at the time of the 
defendant's direct appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reached a contrary result, however, in Estelle 
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In a Catch-22 for the client, the Court concluded appellate 
counsel was not ineffective, because '"winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing 
on' those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of 
effective appellate advocacy." Murray, 477 U.S. at 536 (citation omitted). At the same time, the 
claim was not deemed sufficiently "'novel'" to constitute cause for the procedural default 
because "forms of the claim he now advances had been percolating in the lower courts for years 
at the time of his original appeal." Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted). Mr. Smith was therefore 
barred from raising the issue in federal habeas proceedings and was subsequently executed. 
342
 It is for this reason that, consistent with the text supra accompanying note 27, Subsection 
C refers to "issues that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to high quality 
capital defense representation." 
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Appellate counsel must be familiar with the deadlines for filing petitions for state and 
federal post-conviction relief and how they are affected by the direct appeal. If the conviction and 
sentence are affirmed, appellate counsel should ordinarily file on the client's behalf a petition for 
certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. Under the AEDPA, a client's one-year 
statute of limitations for filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief generally begins to run 
upon the denial of certiorari or when the 90 days for filing a petition has elapsed.343 Appellate 
counsel should therefore immediately inform successor counsel if he or she does not intend to file 
a petition for certiorari or when a petition for certiorari is denied; if successor counsel is not yet 
appointed, counsel should promptly advise the Responsible Agency of the need to designate 
successor counsel. (Subsection D) 
Appellate counsel should also advise the client directly of all applicable deadlines for 
seeking post-conviction relief and explain the tolling provisions of the AEDPA,344 emphasizing 
that a state post-conviction motion should be filed sufficiently in advance of the one-year deadline 
to allow adequate time to prepare a federal habeas corpus petition. In states in which the direct 
appeal and state post-conviction review are conducted simultaneously,345 post-conviction 
proceedings may be concluded at the same time as, or even before, the direct appeal, effectively 
rendering the tolling provisions inapplicable. 
In light of this mutual dependency among all the post-conviction legal procedures, it is of 
the utmost importance that, in accordance with Guideline 10.13, appellate counsel cooperates fully 
with successor counsel and turn over all relevant files promptly. 
B. Collateral Relief- State and Federal 
As described in the Commentary to Guideline 1.1, providing high quality legal 
representation in collateral review proceedings in capital cases requires enormous amounts of 
time, energy and knowledge. The field is increasingly complex and ever changing. As state and 
federal collateral proceedings become ever-more intertwined, counsel representing a capital client 
in state collateral proceedings must become intimately familiar with federal habeas corpus 
procedures. As indicated above, for example, although the AEDPA deals strictly with cases being 
litigated in federal court, its statute of limitations provision creates a de facto statute of limitations 
for filing a collateral review petition in state court. Some state collateral counsel have failed to 
understand the AEDPA's implications, and unwittingly forfeited their client's right to federal 
habeas corpus review.346 
343
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see LIEBMAN & HERTZ, note 27 supra § 5. lb. 
344
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 
345
 See, e.g., Policy 3, California Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From 
Judgments of Death (2002) (petitions for writ of habeas corpus to be filed within 90 days of final 
due date for filing reply brief on direct appeal); 22 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1089(D)(1) (West 
Supp. 2002) (motion for post-conviction relief must be filed within 90 days from filing of reply 
brief on direct appeal). 
346
 See, e.g., Goodman v. Johnson, No. 99-20452 (5th Cir. Sept. 19, 1999) (unpublished), 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1998), cert, 
denied, 525 U.S. 1091 (1999). Spencer Goodman was executed by Texas in January 2000, and 
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Collateral counsel has the same obligation as trial and appellate counsel to establish a 
relationship of trust with the client. But by the time a case reaches this stage, the client will have 
put his life into the hands of at least one other lawyer and found himself on death row. Counsel 
should not be surprised if the client initially exhibits some hostility and lack of trust, and must 
endeavor to overcome these barriers. 
Ultimately, winning collateral relief in capital cases will require changing the picture that 
has previously been presented. The old facts and legal arguments - those which resulted in a 
conviction and imposition of the ultimate punishment, both affirmed on appeal - are unlikely to 
motivate a collateral court to make the effort required to stop the momentum the case has already 
gained in rolling through the legal system.347 Because an appreciable portion of the task of post-
conviction counsel is to change the overall picture of the case, Subsection E(3) requires that they 
keep under continuing review the desirability of amending the defense theory of the case, whether 
one has been formulated by prior counsel in accordance with Guideline 10.10.1 or not. 
For similar reasons, collateral counsel cannot rely on the previously compiled record but 
must conduct a thorough, independent investigation in accordance with Guideline 10.7. 
(Subsection E(4)). As demonstrated by the high percentage of reversals and disturbingly large 
number of innocent persons sentenced to death, the trial record is unlikely to provide either a 
complete or accurate picture of the facts and issues in the case.348 That may be because of 
information concealed by the state, because of witnesses who did not appear at trial or who 
testified falsely, because the trial attorney did not conduct an adequate investigation in the first 
instance, because new developments show the inadequacies of prior forensic evidence, because of 
juror misconduct, or for a variety of other reasons. 
Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are required. One involves 
reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the client. Reinvestigating the case means 
examining the facts underlying the conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial 
counsel's performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct. Reinvestigating the client 
means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client than was known at the time of trial, not 
only to discover mitigation that was not presented previously, but also to identify mental-health 
claims which potentially reach beyond sentencing issues to fundamental questions of competency 
and mental-state defenses. 
As with every other stage of capital proceedings, collateral counsel has a duty in 
accordance with Guideline 10.8 to raise and preserve all arguably meritorious issues.349 These 
include not only challenges to the conviction and sentence, but also issues which may arise 
Andrew Cantu-Tzin was executed by Texas in January 1999. 
347
 See generally Russell Stetler, Post-Conviction Investigation in Death Penalty Cases, THE 
CHAMPION, Aug. 1999, at 41, available at 
http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/ChampionArticles/99Aug06/. 
348
 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
349
 See supra Guideline 10.8 and accompanying Commentary. 
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subsequently.350 Collateral counsel should assume that any meritorious issue not contained in the 
initial application will be waived or procedurally defaulted in subsequent litigation, or barred by 
strict rules governing subsequent applications.351 Counsel should also be aware that any change in 
the availability of post-conviction relief may itself provide an issue for further litigation.352 This 
is especially true if the change occurred after the case was begun and could be argued to have 
affected strategic decisions along the way. 
350
 For example, although the Justices disagree on the point, as shown most recently by their 
varying opinions respecting the certiorari petition in Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470 (2002), it 
may well be that after a certain length of time continued confinement on Death Row ripens into 
an Eighth Amendment violation. 
351
 See Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that as a result of the 
strict rules governing successive habeas corpus petitions enacted by the AEDPA and codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), "it is essential that habeas petitioners include in their first petition all 
potential claims for which they might desire to seek review and relief). 
352
 See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (discussing the retroactive application of 
various procedural provisions in the AEDPA to pending cases). 
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Menzies' Journal Entries Mentioned In Ruling and Brief 
December 22, 1998 
December 22, 1998/Matt Hunsaker addressed court 
Went to court. Angela F. Micklos & Voros for the State. Ed Brass for me. 
Ms. Micklos argued to dismiss habeas again & Ed argued against. Judge 
Uno is going to look at the record & make up his mind hopefully by next 
week. Ms Micklos filed a motion to compel me to have a deposition but Ed 
said he wanted to respond. He has until Jan. 4, 1999 to respond & Ms. 
Micklos has until Jan. 11, 1999 to respond to Ed's response. Ms. Micklos 
said her last day on my case & working for the A.G.'s office is 12-31-98. 
She said the new lawyer's name, but I can't remember it. I spoke briefly to 
Ed both before and after court & he gave me his word he wouldn't tell me 
anymore stories & that he would deal with the $ today. He also said I need 
to trust him more & I told him I'd try. I told Ed his secretary keeps refusing 
to accept my calls & he said she never told him I was trying to call & he 
promised to take care of it. One last thing. Judge Uno let Maureen 
Hunsaker's son "Matt Hunsaker" address the court. He said I should be 
executed as soon as possible like his mom was & that bringing me before 
the court for a hearing 2 days before Christmas was making his & his 
families x-mas hard. He also said all the delays was really hard on his 
grandparents, & he said his mom did have any civil rights & I shouldn't 
either. He talked a lot of bullshit, but he was decent about it & I felt bad for 
him. He seems like a good guy, & in my heart I wish him the best in life. 
(Also, Ed gave me a copy of the "State's Motion for an Order Compelling 
Petitioner's Deposition". I told Ed, no go & to contact Karen Chaney & 
Tim Ford. He said he would call Tim Ford. 
March 4, 1999 
Tried to call Ed Brass at 12:40 pm. Brass picked up the phone, but when he 
heard it was me who was calling, he hung up on me. I called back and Ed 
Brass picked up the phone & when he heard it was a collect call, he hung up 
again. I called back in about 5 minutes and he picked up the phone again, 
but hung up as soon as he heard it was a collect call. I had Mike Archuleta 
try to call Ed Brass 5 minutes later for verification and both myself and 
Mike listened. Ed Brass picked up the phone and then hung up when he 
heard it was me trying to call. 14 minutes later I had Doug Lovell try to call 
when he came out for recreation. Doug said a male voice picked up the 
phone and hung up when he found out it was from me. It pisses me off. I 
still haven't seen my habeas corpus he supposedly amended & the experts 
& investigator still haven't been hired to my knowledge. I guess I'll write 
him this weekend to try & find out what's up. I really don't think the dump 
truck will respond. 
January 23, 2002 
Called Ed Brass's office with Mike Archuleta. We both actually spoke with 
Ed. Ed told me that he was bringing Amy D. out to see me on the 30th or 31st 
while he was seeing Archie. He was going to see me also. He told me to call 
Amy D. on the 24th to get the details. He also said that the State was trying to 
get a summary judgment against me. Ed said it was for failure to prosecute 
our writ but not to worry as it was the state's fault as they had a stay for 
discovery. I asked him how the State could ask for a summary judgment when 
it was their stay & he said "exactly," not to worry. I like Ed and he is an 
awesome attorney. (Go Ed!!!) 
January 2, 2003 
Got letter from Ed Brass. He said state got a summary judgment against me, 
for I don't know what. Weird Letter. 
Wrote Brass a letter- Have a copy, Told him I thought he was awesome, but 
left my life up to him. (See file for copy of letter to Brass) 
March 5, 2003 
Saw Ed Brass. (Yea! Surprise, surprise!) Ed came out to tell me that he has 
put a motion in to Judge Lewis to set aside part of my habeas that Judge Uno 
screwed me on just before he left (retired). He said that Judge Lewis was 
prepared to rule in my behalf but that because she was such good friends with 
Ed and Amy (she even married them), that it might be a conflict of interest for 
both him to represent me & her to be my judge. He told me I had to choose 
between him & Judge Lewis. I told Ed it was a no brainer. He was my 
attorney & I didn't want a new attorney under any circumstances and while I 
like Lewis, I would rather she left than him. Ed said cool & that he would try 
to have her sign the order for me to set aside Uno's fuck-up before she got off 
my case! (Right on Ed Brass! You're cool & a good man.) 
Menzies' Written Correspondence to Brass 
June 16, 1998 
September 24, 1998 
December 1998 
March 24, 1999 
March 28, 1999 
September 8, 1999 
June 12, 2000 
December 1,2001 
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December 2002 
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December 30. 2002 
December 18, 1998 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
321 SOUTH 6TH EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
PHONE (801) 322-5678 
FAX (801) 322-5677 
December I 
Ralph L. Menzies 
Box 250 Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Ralph: 
We are going to argue the motion to dismiss portions of your petition 
on Tuesday. This is in fact the same motion which was previously argued 
and that is all I intend to argue. 
We will a] so be talking about whether you s'hould have to 'have your 
deposition taken. I have passed along your 'position that you should not. 
Cal ] me on Monday if 'you have questions. ^~, 
/£in<^rely, / 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
A. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
321 SOUTH 6TH EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
PHONE (801) 322-5678 
FAX (801) 322-5677 
May lh l^"1 
Mr. Ralph Menzies 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250' 
Draper, Utah 84020 
I\t Interview With Nicole Reitze 
Dear Ralph: 
I have signed a consent allowing Nicole Reitze to interview you for her thesis paper on the 
death penalty. I urge you to sign a release and allow yourself to be interviewed. Your identity will 
remain anonymous and nothing will be used that may identify you or your responses to the questions 
Ms. Reitze may ask. 
December 30, 2002 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
175 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
PHONE (801) 322-5678 
FAX (801) 322-5677 
i)<u i t u n - : u. . .u0 2 
Attorney Client Mail 
Ralph Leroy Menzies 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Ralph: 
I he Attorney General's office has managed to obtain a summary judgment in your writ 
based upon our alleged failure to comply with certain discovery requests on their part. This is 
my responsibility and not yours, I am doing what is necessary to have this set aside. However, if 
this should cause you to lose any faith in me, I would not blame you. You should let me know, 
by writing me a letter, what your desires are with respect to this matter. 
If you would like to discuss this by telephone, you can call my secretary who will accept 
your call and then schedule a time when the phone is available to you and when I will be in the 
office. 
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